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Abstract 
 
There are numerous studies on polygraphs like the Concealed Information 
Test (CIT) that aim to detect whether a suspect possesses crime-related 
knowledge. In contrast, not a single psychophysiological or behavioral paradigm 
targets the credibility of a victim’s accusation. For that purpose, a Credibility-
CIT was developed in four studies. Participants experienced certain situations 
(truth tellers) or invented a story about these events (liars). Subsequently, the 
participants were interviewed about the alleged occurrences. The methodological 
innovation is that the given testimony served as an individual database for the 
items used in the Credibility-CIT: Short phrases that either referred to a lie or a 
true statement were selected from each participant’s testimony. These 
idiographic items, called credibility probe items, were presented in the 
Credibility-CIT amongst several distractor items while response times and error 
rates were recorded.  
Results of three studies indicate that liars respond more slowly than truth 
tellers to credibility probe items (dStudy 1 = 0.55, dStudy 2 = 0.42, dStudy 4 = 0.47). 
Different encoding processes and emotional-motivational factors that induce 
varying orienting responses provide an explanation for the response time 
differences. In contrast, Study 3 did not indicate significant differences between 
truth tellers and liars. Methodological issues – especially regarding the selected 
response deadline – are discussed. In addition, EEG data were recorded in Study 
4 but event-related potentials did not discriminate truth tellers from liars. Lastly, 
a meta-analysis was conducted over the four studies included in this research 
project. An overall effect size of g = 0.40 was observed for the Credibility-CIT’s 
efficiency to discriminate truth tellers from liars based on response times. The 
results indicate that the Credibility-CIT has a meaningful potential as an indirect 
measure for credibility assessment. 
  
Keywords: Credibility Assessment, Concealed Information Test, CIT, memory 
detection 
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Introduction 
 
Liars and deniers are the two faces of deception. Both know the truth but 
claim something else – what they differ in is the content of this claim. When 
focusing on forensic contexts, liars simulate episodic memories about a crime 
and actively invent a story about that offense (i.e., an alleged victim/witness 
giving a false incrimination, or a suspect giving a false confession). In contrast, 
deniers negate or dissimulate any knowledge about an offense that they actually 
attended (i.e., a factual culprit, or a witness who protects the offender). Detecting 
any kind of deception is probably one of the oldest aims in civilized societies and 
of particular importance in forensic settings.  
There is plenty of research on numerous “lie detector” paradigms – some 
corroborating and others challenging their respective validity (Lykken, 1998). 
What all “lie detectors” have in common is that the respondent is the suspect of 
a crime (i.e., a denier). Psychophysiological methods that scrutinize the 
credibility of a witnesses’ statement (i.e., liars) do not exist yet; for this context 
of credibility assessment, only content-related approaches are applied. Even 
though lie detection and credibility assessment are methodologically different, 
they are not incompatible. Both approaches rely on a cognitive theory of 
deception and emphasize the role of memory processes and information 
processing in deception detection. This focus on cognition is also the reason why 
the term “lie detection” was replaced with the more accurate label “memory 
detection” (Verschuere & Meijer, 2014). Based on extensive work on memory-
detection paradigms identifying deniers, this research project aims to develop a 
memory-detection paradigm for credibility assessment – that is, a response time-
based procedure to debunk liars. 
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Credibility Assessment 
In forensic contexts, a witness’s – and particularly a victim’s – statement 
about an offense constitutes important evidence. When there is no material 
evidence (like DNA material or similar), testimonies are often the only proof 
available. The Statement Validity Analysis (SVA; Köhnken & Steller, 1988) is 
the most established credibility assessment procedure in Germany and some 
other Western countries (Vrij, 2005). The SVA is a verbal approach that focuses 
on a testimony’s content. The SVA’s core component is the Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis (CBCA). The CBCA is based on the assumption that true 
statements have a higher quality than fabricated accounts (Undeutsch, 1989). As 
initially pointed out, truth tellers – in contrast to liars – can rely on episodic 
memory. Hence, true accounts should, for example, include more sensory 
information, unusual details, description of affective states, and contextual 
embedding (Volbert & Steller, 2014). Statements are analyzed for these “reality 
criteria”. A high quantity and especially quality of these content characteristics 
are considered to be indicative of the credibility of a statement, but the absence 
of the characteristics does not indicate lying. Due to that, Rassin (2000) criticizes 
the CBCA as suffering from a “truth bias”. Based on this focus on indicators of 
episodic memory, the SVA can, at its foundation, be classified as a memory-
detection paradigm.  
Cognitive Load Theory 
A cognitive approach that stresses the relevance of memory processes 
builds the theoretical framework of credibility assessment. According to 
cognitive load theory, lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling as 
it requires multitasking from the liar (Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij, Fisher, 
Mann, & Leal, 2006). Liars have to engage in several tasks simultaneously 
(Volbert & Steller, 2014): They have to fabricate a story solely based on 
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cognitive scripts since they cannot rely on episodic memory about the 
incriminated event. Additionally, liars must avoid misinformation that can be 
revealed through a criminal investigation. Questions by the interviewer must be 
answered spontaneously and answers have to logically fit in the account given 
so far. If interrogated before, liars must also keep their previous statements in 
mind to avoid contradictions. These processes account for the high cognitive load 
of lying. Moreover, liars have to engage in strategic self-presentation in order to 
convey a trustworthy impression. Although this impression management is 
mainly determined motivationally, it still demands cognitive and especially 
working memory resources (Sporer, 2016).  
Empirical evidence supports the cognitive load theory by indicating an 
influence of cognitive load on the form and content of lies. First and foremost, 
several studies and also meta-analyses indicate that lies have a lower quality as 
compared to recapitulating experiences (i.e., lies are less detailed and less 
embedded in a context; Volbert & Steller, 2014; for meta-analytical results see 
Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilariño, 2016; Oberlader et al., 2016). Moreover, the 
cognitive demand of lying is also shown on a neurological level. Prefrontal brain 
areas that are associated with executive control are activated during lying (Christ, 
Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; Gamer, 2011). 
Additionally, the cognitive demand is reflected in behavioral changes. Since 
constructing the lie takes time and resources, responding deceitfully takes longer 
than responding truthfully in some reaction time paradigms (Suchotzki, 
Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017).  
Validity 
A recent meta-analysis indicates the validity of the CBCA to discriminate 
liars from truth tellers with a large mean effect size of g = 0.97 (Oberlader et al., 
2016). However, keeping in mind that the SVA is the only reliable method when 
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there is no objective evidence, improving its detection accuracy seems highly 
desirable. Following a multi-method approach and by that dealing with the 
CBCA’s truth bias (Rassin, 2000) would enhance the accuracy of court 
decisions. Until now, no complementary paradigms focusing on aspects other 
than content (e.g., psychophysiological or behavioral measures) have been 
developed for credibility assessment. From a theoretical perspective, the 
different memory processes underlying truth telling and lying (based on episodic 
memory vs. cognitive scripts) could be useful for diagnostic purposes. Hence, a 
latency-based memory-detection paradigm might be a promising new approach. 
Response Time (RT) Approaches to Discriminate Truth Tellers from Liars 
As already briefly mentioned, there is evidence that response time (RT) is 
a cue to deception (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). Responding 
deceptively to either a verbal question or a written stimulus takes longer than 
answering truthfully (Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014). This finding led 
Walczyk and colleagues to develop the Activation-Decision-Construction-
Action Theory (ADCAT; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014; for a previous 
version of the model see Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009; 
Walczyk et al., 2005, 2003). This model explains the RT increase of deceptively 
answering questions in four (mostly) consecutive steps.  
In the first step – called the activation component – the to-be answered 
question is encoded. Episodes or semantic memory content of the truth are 
activated in long-term memory. The truth is then automatically retrieved to 
working memory (Baddeley, 1992, 2000; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Sporer, 
2016). Not only during truth telling but also during lying, the truth is usually 
activated and enters consciousness (i.e., working memory) in a first step. Other 
authors termed this assumption of the prepotent truth response “truth default 
theory” (Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014).  
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According to ADCAT, in a second step (the decision component), the 
respondent decides to either lie or tell the truth. For evaluating the benefits and 
costs of truth telling motivational processes play a central role. This decision and 
evaluation process adds to RTs for liars.  
In the third step (the construction component), the lie is invented. The truth 
is still activated in working memory and serves as a retrieval cue for lie 
construction. Liars can reduce the cognitive load by keeping the truth active and 
inventing an answer as close to this truth as possible (e.g., simply omitting or 
denying information). Inventing complex lies imposes a much higher load. For 
complex lies, semantic memory (scripts, schemata) and episodic memory (the 
truth and similar events) aids the construction of a convincing, consistent, and 
plausible answer (Sporer, 2016). This lie construction process will add to RT, 
too.  
The last step concerns the verbal or habitual delivery of the lie (the action 
component). As the truth is the normative answer and active in working memory 
(see step 1), this honest response must be inhibited by the central executive. 
Moreover, liars engage in monitoring their behavior to appear credible. This also 
demands cognitive resources. Additionally, Walczyk et al. (2014) integrate the 
motivation to lie as an essential moderator in the ADCAT. They conceptualize 
motivation as the amount of cognitive resources the respondent is willing to 
invest in lying.  
In order to test the ADCAT, Walczyk et al. conducted several studies that 
measured RTs between a question and the given answer using a voice key. Time 
between the last word of a question and the first utterance of the respondent’s 
answer served as dependent variable (Walczyk et al., 2003, 2005, 2009). The 
studies indicated a trend that liars respond more slowly than truth tellers. 
However, results were inconsistent and the authors’ explanations for 
insignificant findings not convincing. Moreover, meta-analytical results indicate 
The Credibility-CIT 
 18 
that the latency between a question and the given answer is an invalid cue to 
deception (d = 0.02; DePaulo et al., 2003). On the other hand, studies using 
paradigms other than the voice key support the ADCAT’s assumptions. 
Suchotzki et al. (2017) argue that it is not the RT effect itself that is invalid, but 
rather there are methodological issues in Walczyk et al.’s studies that induce the 
invalid RT results. Suchotzki et al. point out that for reliable RT-based memory 
detection paradigms, a computerized measurement, an instruction for fast 
responding, and a large number of valid trials are necessary. In their meta-
analysis (Suchotzki et al., 2017), four paradigms met these criteria and proved to 
reliably discriminate truth and deceit: The autobiographical Implicit Association 
Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), the Sheffield Lie 
Test (Spence et al., 2001), the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (Furedy, 
Davis, & Gurevich, 1988), and the Concealed Information Test (Lykken, 1960). 
However, these paradigms have only been used in classic contexts of memory 
detection, mainly differentiating between a suspect of a crime (denier) and 
innocent subjects. None has ever been applied for credibility assessment, 
discriminating liars from truth tellers.  
The Concealed Information Test (CIT) 
The most theoretically founded memory detection approach is the 
Concealed Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1960). The CIT is a computer-based 
paradigm that confronts a suspect with crime-related items while 
psychophysiological, neuronal, or behavioral measures are recorded (e.g., heart 
rate, skin conductance, event-related potentials [ERPs], RTs). Since suspects 
typically negate any offense-related knowledge, the classic CIT intends to 
distinguish deniers from innocents. 
In the CIT, participants are confronted with several multiple-choice 
questions regarding previously undisclosed details of a certain crime (Lykken, 
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1959). For example, one question could concern the murder weapon (“What did 
the murderer use to bludgeon the victim’s head?”). The question is then followed 
by the presentation of several potential answers (e.g., “vase, candleholder, rifle, 
cane, ashtray”), one of which corresponds to the actual fact. The basic rationale 
is that only guilty participants should recognize the correct response option (i.e., 
the actual weapon that was used to commit the murder) and show an orienting 
response. Therefore, their physiological response following the presentation of 
this option should be different from their response to the other options. This is 
traditionally assessed using peripheral measures of autonomous nervous activity 
(Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). 
More recent laboratory versions of the CIT often involve the use of RTs and 
ERPs (see, e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991). In these variants, several words are 
presented consecutively on a screen. Among these are a few crime-related items 
(called probe items; e.g., considering the murder weapon: “knife”) and a large 
amount of distractor items (called irrelevant items; e.g., “gun”, “rope”, 
“hammer”, “bat”). Exactly as in the original version of the CIT, it is assumed 
that the probe items should stand out and trigger a special response only in 
culprits. In contrast, probes should not be distinguishable from irrelevant items 
to innocent participants. In order to warrant the participant’s attention, a third 
item category is added, called target items. Target items have to be memorized 
before the beginning of the test. During the CIT, the question “Do you know this 
item?” is asked. Participants must tell whether the presented item is a memorized 
target item or not. Hence, target items must be confirmed (verbally or via button 
press: “Yes, I know this item”), but probe and irrelevant items have to be denied 
(“No, I don’t know this item”).  
Crucial to the CIT is that probes fall in the familiar category for only guilty 
participants. As a consequence, accidentally confirming knowledge of the 
critical probe items (e.g., the murder weapon) would immediately expose the 
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participant as culprit. Hence, guilty participants have to deal with the conflict 
between the familiarity of the probe stimulus and the urgent need to respond 
negating (“I don’t know this item”). This stimulus-response incompatibility is 
central to the accuracy of the CIT and a lack of stimulus-response incompatibility 
is a large disadvantage of several other RT paradigms (De Houwer, 2008; 
Suchotzki, Verschuere, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2013; Verschuere, Crombez, 
Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010). This significance of probe items is also referred to 
as oddball paradigm (Farwell & Donchin, 1991). 
Orienting Response Theory 
The orienting response theory builds the theoretical framework for the CIT. 
An orienting response (Sokolov, 1963) is elicited whenever a stimulus is novel, 
has a certain significance (i.e., has a signal value), or whenever changes in 
stimulation occur. In contrast, stimuli without significance result in habituation 
(Sokolov, 1963; Verschuere & Ben-Shakhar, 2011; Verschuere, Crombez, De 
Clercq, & Koster, 2004). Presentation of probe items in a CIT induces effects 
that share several characteristics with orienting responses. On a physiological 
level, orienting towards probe items leads to increased skin conductance (Ben-
Shakhar & Elaad, 2003), heart rate deceleration (Verschuere et al., 2004), 
respiratory suppression (Gamer, 2011), and pupil dilatation (Lubow & Fein, 
1996) – autonomic reactions that are also related to orienting responses. 
Neuronal activation of large amplitudes is elicited by familiar and meaningful 
stimuli (Rosenfeld, 2011) and therefore indicative of orienting responses. 
Specifically, probe presentation induces large P300 amplitudes in guilty 
participants (Gamer, 2011; Gamer, Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 
2012). Moreover, an activation of the inferior frontal gyrus supports this theory 
as this brain region is active when unexpected events (like probe presentation) 
occur (Gamer, 2011). On a behavioral level, RTs and error rates increase when 
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novel stimuli or probes are shown (Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Seymour, Seifert, 
Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000; Verschuere et al., 2010).  
Emotional-motivational factors. Notably, emotional-motivational factors 
can be integrated in this cognitive theory as they may influence the probe items’ 
significance (Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1989; Verschuere & Ben-Shakhar, 2011). A 
high motivation to avoid being detected as a denier leads to a higher 
noteworthiness of the relevant probe items. In turn, this enhanced signal value of 
the probe items strengthens the orienting response and, hence, the CIT effect 
(Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1989). 
Response Inhibition 
Besides orienting towards the salient probe items, response inhibition plays 
a crucial role in concealing information. As already mentioned, the prepotent 
truth response has to be inhibited when lying (see ADCAT and truth default 
theory). The influence of inhibition is observable when the response conflict is 
removed from the CIT task (i.e., when participants admit knowledge about the 
critical probe items). In those overt deception tasks the RT-based CIT effect 
diminishes (Meijer, Smulders, Merckelbach, & Wolf, 2007; Suchotzki, 
Verschuere, Peth, Crombez, & Gamer, 2015). In contrast to RTs, two meta-
analyses indicated that skin conductance does not depend on actively deceiving 
and, hence, on inhibiting the true response (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Meijer, 
Selle, Elber, & Ben-Shakhar, 2014). Conclusively, both, orienting response and 
response inhibition are relevant for the CIT effect with skin conductance 
reflecting orienting responses and RTs reflecting the role of inhibition processes. 
Validity 
A meta-analysis indicated that the CIT using skin conductance yields an 
effect size of d = 1.55 for discriminating deniers (guilty participants) from 
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innocents (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). Systematically comparing different CIT 
measures, RTs performed best (d = 1.97), followed by skin conductance (d = 
1.46), heart rate (d = 1.07), and respiration (d = 0.85) (Verschuere et al., 2010). 
A threat to the CIT’s validity is the vulnerability to countermeasures or faking 
(for a review see Ben-Shakhar, 2011). However, the RT-based CIT is less prone 
to countermeasures than physiological CITs, especially when a response 
deadline is added forcing the participant to react as quickly as possible (e.g., in 
less than 1,000 ms per item; Seymour et al., 2000). This speeded version of the 
RT-CIT seems to be a promising and thereby economic paradigm for memory 
detection. Besides its psychometric properties and practicability, the CIT is a 
theoretically founded indirect measure. 
Fields of application. As initially pointed out, the CIT’s classic field of 
application is the detection of culprits denying knowledge about a crime. Beyond 
the large number of laboratory studies, the CIT is practically applied on a daily 
base in Japan with about 5,000 examinations annually (Matsuda, Nittono, & 
Allen, 2012; Osugi, 2011). Moreover, the CIT can detect not only knowledge 
about crimes committed in the past, but also criminal intent (Meijer, Verschuere, 
& Merckelbach, 2010). Hence, the CIT’s efficiency does not rely on actually 
enacting with the crime-related objects that later serve as probe items; rather, 
mentally dealing with these issues is sufficient to induce an orienting response. 
In other words, the CIT is sensitive to both, episodic and semantic memory 
content.  
Additionally, the CIT can be applied not only in forensic settings, but also 
in clinical populations to examine memory processes in patients with memory 
deficits and to test for malingering (Allen, 2011). For example, the CIT is used 
with patients who have prosopagnosia or dissociative identity disorder. Patients 
with prosopagnosia are incapable of recognizing faces and are, in the CIT, 
confronted with pictures of familiar and unfamiliar faces (Bauer, 1984). 
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Regarding dissociative identity disorder, the focus lies on whether different 
“identities” can recall information from another (“inter-identity amnesia”; Allen 
& Movius, 2000). These applications of the CIT have in common that patients 
react systematically on probe items that they claim not to recognize explicitly 
(e.g., faces, knowledge of concurrent identities). The central and unresolved 
question is whether the prosopagnostic and dissociative identity patients faked 
their memory deficits or whether the CIT is actually capable of measuring 
implicit memory of which participants are unaware (Allen, 2011). At least for 
the prosopagnostic patients, malingering is rather unlikely as this deficit usually 
causes many complications in social life while benefits are negligible. However, 
it remains unclear whether the CIT is sensitive to implicit memory (Allen, 2011). 
Overall, it is apparent that the CIT is sensitive to episodic, semantic, and 
possibly even to implicit memory. It is crucial that at least some knowledge about 
the subject matter exists. It seems that it is not so much the memory system itself, 
but rather the process of forming the memory content that should be consulted to 
complement the CIT’s theoretical framework. The levels of processing theory 
ideally fits this demand. 
Levels of Processing Theory 
The levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) integrates the 
processes of encoding and storage of information in memory. In contrast to the 
classic multicomponent models on memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), the levels of processing theory argues that semantic, 
visual, and acoustic stimuli are processed and stored similarly. The durability of 
a memory trace is rather a function of depth of encoding. Depth of encoding was 
initially considered to be a continuum of perceptual sensory processing (shallow) 
to semantic operations (deep). Later work (Craik & Tulving, 1975) emphasized 
that “depth” is an inadequate metaphor since processing is not sequential from 
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perceptual to semantic. Rather, the terms “spread” or “elaboration” 
conceptualize the process as flexible. During elaborative processing associations 
between new information and information stored in memory are built. Hence, 
the levels of processing theory postulates that a recourse on memory is necessary 
for good retention. Elaborately encoded information will be maintained better 
and can be retrieved more easily (Craik & Tulving, 1975). In contrast, 
maintenance rehearsal (repeating information, learning by heart) only occurs at 
one processing level and, thus, represents shallow encoding that does not 
facilitate retention (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  
Levels of Processing and CIT 
As initially outlined, unless participants have encoded the (crime-related) 
information, an item cannot gain the significance it needs to induce an orienting 
response in the CIT. Besides the general need for basic encoding, studies indicate 
that even the elaboration of encoding has an impact on the CIT effect. Carmel, 
Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) instructed participants to commit 
a mock crime. Half of them incidentally processed the relevant details while 
committing the crime (shallow encoding); the other half were instructed to pay 
close attention to certain details while committing the crime (elaborate 
encoding). During the CIT, participants intentionally memorizing and 
elaborately encoding the details had a higher skin conductance response to the 
relevant probe items than participants who encoded the information incidentally 
did.  
A study by Seymour and Fraynt (2009) manipulated time and encoding 
effects using an RT-CIT. For the purpose of encoding, all participants were given 
a list of the crime-related probe items. Afterwards, half of the participants read 
an article that contained the same probe items (shallow encoding condition), 
while the other half had to complete four tasks involving these probe items 
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(picture matching, word jumble, hand writing, and word shouting; deep encoding 
condition). The RT-CIT was conducted after a delay of 10 minutes, 24 hours, or 
1 week. Results indicated that deeply (or better, elaborately) encoded items 
induce a larger RT-CIT effect than shallowly encoded items do (Figure 1). 
Seymour and Fraynt (2009) refer to the levels of processing theory for this effect, 
arguing that elaborately processed stimuli are better recalled and, hence, elicit 
stronger responses.  
 
 
Figure 1. Time and encoding effects on the RT-CIT effect (RT on probes – RT 
on irrelevants) in the study by Seymour and Fraynt (2009). Deeply encoded 
information induced a stronger RT-CIT effect than shallowly studied 
information. Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Figure adopted from Seymour and 
Fraynt (2009). 
The Credibility-CIT 
 26 
Since elaborately encoded stimuli are generally better recalled (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972), it remains unclear whether the CIT effects in the Seymour and 
Fraynt study rely only on better recognition in the deep encoding condition rather 
than on the impact of the encoding process itself. This relevance of recall effects 
for the CIT effect is indicated in a study by Gamer, Kosiol, and Vossel (2010): 
Participants had to commit a mock crime in which central details had to be 
processed to successfully commit the crime (e.g., memorizing a certain 
password). Encoding of peripheral details (i.e., the color of the stolen object) 
happened rather incidentally and was not guaranteed. Results indicated that 
elaborately encoded central stimuli were better recalled than peripheral details. 
The CIT was conducted immediately or two weeks after the mock crime and 
indicated mixed results. Heart rates on peripheral details remained stable over 
time but increased for central details. In contrast, skin conductance and 
respiratory data did not differ between the elaborately and shallowly encoded 
stimuli.  
It is apparent that the elaborateness of encoding and its associated recall 
effect have an impact on the CIT’s efficiency. In addition to these studies that 
systematically manipulate encoding strategies, other studies compare 
participants who differ in the acquisition of task-relevant information. Those 
studies compare guilty participants with informed innocents or participants who 
intend to commit a mock crime. Guilty participants actually commit a mock 
crime and, hence, gain crime-related information by interacting with the objects 
(seeing, touching, smelling etc.). Informed innocent participants read or hear 
basic information about a crime but do not handle or operate with the crime-
related objects. Their role is comparable to innocent persons informed by the 
media. In studies on intended crimes, participants are asked to plan but not to 
complete a mock crime. Hence, participants in the informed, the intended, and 
the guilty group have knowledge about the event and, thus, act as different types 
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of deniers in the CIT. Crucially, the three groups deal with the crime-related 
information differently and thus vary in their levels of processing or elaboration 
of encoding. Participants enacting the mock crime (i.e., guilty participants) 
collect the crime-related information incidentally, encode it primarily at a 
sensory level, and embed it spatiotemporally; semantic encoding plays a minor 
role. In contrast, participants in informed innocent groups are solely informed 
about crime-related facts and encode incidentally but also semantically. 
Participants who intend a mock crime use their long-term memory to mentally 
complement the event (using scripts or schemata) and generate a mental image 
of the event. Hence, they encode the information mainly semantically, that is, 
more elaborately (Craik & Tulving, 1975).  
It remains inconsistent whether the CIT can discriminate between 
participants in the informed, the intended, and the guilty group and, hence, if the 
CIT is sensitive to different levels of processing (Ben-Shakhar, Gronau, & Elaad, 
1999; Bradley, MacLaren, & Carle, 1996; Elaad, 2009; Gamer, 2010; Gamer et 
al., 2010; Meijer et al., 2010; Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2014; Suchotzki et al., 2013; 
Winograd & Rosenfeld, 2014). Several authors argue that discrepancies in these 
results depend to a large extent on the studies’ methodological approaches 
(Bradley, Barefoot, & Arsenault, 2011; Elaad, 2009; Gamer et al., 2010). They 
primarily criticize that the studies differ in the amount of detail given to informed 
innocents, in the time for planning the intended mock crime, and – especially – 
in the instructions for encoding the crime-related information (intentional versus 
incidental). These considerations again demonstrate the crucial role of encoding 
for the CIT’s accuracy.  
Overall, the orienting response theory sufficiently accounts for the fact that 
knowing participants orient towards probe items whereas unknowing (innocent) 
participants do not. However, it does not explain why signal values and, hence, 
orienting responses vary across different samples of knowing participants 
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(guilty, intended, and informed innocent). Differences in information processing 
– or, more specifically, in encoding – can complement the theoretical framework 
for the CIT by supplementing the orienting response theory. Furthermore, this 
integration of the levels of processing theory in the orienting response theory 
offers new perspectives for further fields of application – namely for credibility 
assessment. 
Applying a CIT in the Context of Credibility Assessment 
As initially described, the theoretical framework for credibility assessment 
stresses the divergent memory processes of truth tellers and liars. Although truth 
tellers can rely on sensory input and episodic memory when giving the 
testimony, liars have to use cognitive scripts and semantic memory to invent a 
consistent story. The cognitive load theory emphasizes that these contrasting 
cognitive representations induce differences in cognitive demand and finally in 
the quality of testimonies. In contrast, the orienting response theory – as the most 
prominent explanatory model for the CIT – focuses on an attentional rather than 
a memory approach. However, more recently, information processing and the 
related memory processes have become topics of interest in CIT research, too. 
Even though the impact of information processing on the CIT was not embedded 
in a larger theoretical framework yet, the studies cited above emphasize that 
depth of encoding has a crucial influence on orienting responses in the CIT. 
Hence, the relevance of information processing (especially encoding) for both 
credibility assessment and CIT seems evident.  
The classic CIT compares knowing participants who acted as mock crime 
culprits or read about a crime (guilty participants, i.e., deniers) with a completely 
unknowing control group (innocents). In contrast, in a CIT for credibility 
assessment one would need to compare knowing participants who talk about 
experienced events (truth tellers) with participants who actively invent a story 
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and hence simulate memory (liars). The distinction between truth tellers and liars 
is far more challenging as both have a certain knowledge about the alleged 
events. However, the elaboration of encoding of the incident and consequently 
the cognitive representation of it are likely to differ. Reflecting the relevance of 
levels of processing for the CIT in the light of credibility assessment leads to the 
assumption that liars and truth tellers should show different orienting responses 
in a CIT.  
Besides the divergent levels of processing, liars and truth tellers also differ 
in their emotional and motivational involvement. In contrast to truth tellers, liars 
engage in strategic self-presentation (Volbert & Steller, 2014). Practically, 
emotional-motivational factors also influence the CIT by enhancing the signal 
value and, hence, the orienting towards relevant items (Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 
1989; Verschuere & Ben-Shakhar, 2011). This might induce a stronger orienting 
towards lie-related stimuli than towards truth-related stimuli.  
Lastly, the ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014) postulates that the different 
cognitive demands of truth tellers and liars reflect in RTs. According to ADCAT, 
a deceitful response takes longer than a truthful one due to the time-consuming 
activation of the truth, evaluation of costs and benefits of lying (decision 
component), retrieval of the truth while constructing the lie, and execution of the 
deceitful response whilst motivational processes also cost cognitive resources. 
Overall, there is converging evidence that truth tellers and liars should differ in 
a CIT-like paradigm and that this should be reflected in longer RTs for liars. 
After all, the levels of processing theory, emotional-motivational factors, and the 
ADCAT are relevant for both credibility assessment and CIT. This gives reason 
to assume that liars and truth tellers should show distinct reactions in a CIT. 
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Methodological Considerations 
Despite the theoretical foundation and satisfactory psychometric properties 
of the CIT, its great disadvantage remains its applicability. The CIT is only 
suitable when objective evidence is available that can be used for constructing 
the probe items (e.g., the actual murder weapon “knife”). As already pointed out, 
these objective proofs are exactly what is lacking when credibility assessment is 
solicited. Thus, at first sight it seems that the CIT does not seem to be applicable 
in contexts of credibility assessment in which nothing than a witness’s statement 
is available. However, to the best of my knowledge no previous research has 
attempted to record psychophysiological or behavioral data while confronting 
liars and truth tellers with personalized probe items that comprise literal phrases 
of his or her testimony. Analogous to the classic CIT, participants should deny 
any knowledge of probe items and irrelevant items but confirm knowledge of 
target items. The stimulus-response incompatibility for probe items should 
induce a conflict for truth tellers and liars. However, this conflict is expected to 
be stronger for liars. 
Hypotheses 
Memory processes of liars differ crucially from memory processes of truth 
tellers. Liars should initially engage in an elaborate encoding and rehearsal 
process; they use the essential facts and broaden them with cognitive scripts to 
intentionally fabricate and finally memorize a comprehensive story (Volbert, 
2010). Giving a false confession in the subsequent interview promotes elaborate 
encoding as it involves a high cognitive load (inventing a consistent story), 
motivational factors (self-presentation as trustworthy), and emotional processes 
(fear of being debunked) (Volbert & Steller, 2014). These emotional-
motivational factors get linked with the semantic content of the lie. In sum, these 
factors should lead to a high signal value of lie-related content. Being confronted 
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with personalized lie-related items in a CIT should induce a strong orienting 
response and, hence, long RTs as wells as high error rates. Moreover, the 
ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014) postulates that lying involves the activation and 
further the inhibition of the true response, which additionally explains an 
increase in RTs. For liars who are confronted with an idiographic probe item of 
their lie, this truth concerns inventing the probe item. The episode of inventing 
the lie, its semantic content, the episode of telling it, as well as the corresponding 
emotional-motivational states are activated and have to be inhibited in a CIT.  
In contrast, truth tellers form episodic memory content while experiencing 
an event. Information is encoded incidentally during the experience, whereas the 
activation of semantic memory content should play a subordinate role. Due to 
the low cognitive effort of memorizing and reporting an experience, the absence 
of any motivation to lie, and the moderate elaboration of encoding, event-related 
items should have a moderate signal value. Consequently, this should induce 
moderate RT and error rate effects. 
In sum, liars and truth tellers should differ in their elaboration of encoding 
and storage of the incriminated event as well as in their motivational and 
affective states. This, in turn, should induce different signal values of items that 
pertain to fabricated or experienced events. Due to the stronger signal value, liars 
should show stronger orienting responses and, hence, longer RT effects in a CIT 
as compared to truth tellers. 
 

  33 
Study 1 – Student Sample 
 
Study 1 was conducted to develop a CIT suitable to distinguish truth tellers 
and liars. Experiencing and fabricating events involve different cognitive 
processes and resources that induce different signal values for crime-related 
information. Confronting participants with idiographic items that refer to a 
personal testimony should induce orienting responses. The strength of this 
orienting response should be larger for liars than for truth tellers. As initially 
pointed out, CITs can be assessed using behavioral, neuronal, or physiological 
paradigms. Since RTs seem to perform best (Verschuere et al., 2010) and are 
easily and economically measurable, an RT-based Credibility-CIT was 
developed in this study. 
Method 
Sample 
A sample of 60 psychology students participated for course credit and gave 
their informed consent. Data from participants with more than 30% incorrect 
trials on irrelevant items or more than 60% on target items were excluded 
because those participants either did not understand the task or did not follow the 
instructions (n = 4). One participant was excluded due to software problems. The 
final sample consisted of N = 55 students (82% female) with a mean age of 23.17 
years (SD = 4.84). 
Procedure 
The study was conducted using a between-group design with random 
assignment to the two experimental groups. The participants were informed that 
some participants would experience and report about certain tasks and others 
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would tell a fabricated story about these events. Immediately afterwards an 
interviewer and after a one-week interval a “lie detector” would try to find out 
whether the testimony was true or invented. The participants’ task was to 
convince the interviewer and the lie detector that their own story was true (for 
detailed participant’s instructions in German, see Appendices A-F, p. 110-121). 
In the truth group, a dyad of two participants (hereafter called truth tellers) 
participated together but held different roles. One participant (offender) got a list 
with rough descriptions of nine slightly aversive tasks (e.g., “put feet in slime”, 
“hold hands in ice water”, “put on a stinky shirt”, see Table 1). He or she was 
instructed to pick five out of nine tasks and urge the other person (victim) to 
perform those actions. The victim got a list with the same tasks. Victims were 
informed that the other participant will ask him or her to complete several 
unpleasant tasks and that it would be alright to refuse or negotiate with the 
counterpart. Hence, the aim was not to actually perform each task but to keep the 
participants busy with the objects. While the dyad interacted and dealt with the 
tasks, the experimenter waited outside the room and surveilled the participants 
on a screen to avoid disturbing the dyadic interaction. No video recordings were 
made.  
Liars were randomly assigned to pretend being the victim or the offender 
during the alleged events. Lying victims and lying offenders received the same 
list with rough descriptions of the nine tasks that was also given to the truth-
telling participants (Table 1). They were instructed pick five out of those nine 
tasks and fabricate a story on how they performed those. However, liars were not 
given information about details of the actual tasks at any time. E.g., they did not 
know the color and texture of the slime for the feet or the design of the stinky 
shirt. Liars were given 25 minutes to fabricate a detailed story about five of those 
events and were allowed to take notes. 
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Table 1 
Participant’s Instructions and Descriptions of the Actual Tasks.  
Instructions given to all 
Participants 
Details on the Task  
(Unknown to Liars) 
Eat a cookie with a dry worm 
lying upon it. 1, 2 
Several butter biscuits with dried mealworms 
from a pet supply store on them were on a 
plate. One fresh biscuit was off to the side, 
not touching a worm at any time. 
Explore things in a box you 
cannot look into. 1, 2 
The box contained oily spaghetti, artificial 
fur, and jelly.  
Hold an object with your arm 
outstretched. 1, 2 
A cup filled with sugar had to be held as long 
as possible. 
Touch dirty toilet paper. 1, 2 The piece of toilet paper was smudged with 
chocolate cream. 
Put on a stinky and worn T-
shirt. 1, 2 
The shirt was smudged with oil and vinegar. 
Put your feet in slime. 1, 2 The “slime” was water-soluble paste. 
Cleaning utensils were on hand. 
Put your hands in ice water. 1 A bucket was filled with ice and water. 
Participants decided for themselves when to 
finish the task. The “offender” measured the 
time. 
Put your hands in dirt. 2 The “dirt” was fresh flower soil mixed with 
water. 
Put your hands in a box of 
slimy condoms. 1 
The condoms were unwrapped, unrolled, and 
wetted with lubricant. 
Put lubricant on a dildo. 1 The dildo was skin-colored.  
Take objects out of a box 
with your fingers being 
sticky. 2 
After using hand lotion, participants had to 
find small objects in a box filled with down 
feathers. 
Note. Truth tellers completed five of the above tasks. Liars had to fabricate a 
story based on these instructions but did not gain any more details. 1 Task used 
in Study 1. 2 Task used in Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4. 
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Immediately after experiencing or fabricating an event, all participants 
(truth telling victims, truth telling offenders, lying victims, and lying offenders) 
were interrogated about the occurrences by an interviewer who was blind to the 
experimental condition. The interviews were recorded on tape because the 
statements served as a source for the probe items used in the Credibility-CIT (and 
were analyzed via CBCA, reported in Rönspies, in prep.).  
Credibility-CIT 
Items. The Credibility-CIT was conducted one week after the first session 
of experiencing/fabricating, as a study by Seymour and Fraynt (2009) indicated 
that a one-week interval increases the RT difference between elaborately and 
shallowly encoded information (for another study manipulating delay, see 
Carmel et al., 2003). During the RT task, 20 target items (memorized and to-be-
recognized items), 80 irrelevant items (distractors), and 20 probe items (critical 
items) were randomly presented on a computer screen. Each stimulus was a two- 
or three-word phrase. The 20 probe items were further divided into 10 credibility 
probes and 10 knowledge probes.  
The item construction of the credibility probes was an important innovation 
of this research project. Credibility probes were personalized phrases in the exact 
words previously used by each participant. The phrases were drawn from the 
record of each individual’s statement and therefore customized for every 
participant. For example, if a participant told the interviewer “During the 
experiment, my counterpart asked me to wear a disgusting shirt”, the credibility 
probe item “disgusting shirt” was extracted. All credibility probe items referred 
to central details of the statement. This procedure was the same for truth tellers 
and liars. Item extraction was done by an experimenter who was blind to the 
participants’ condition. 
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The remaining 10 probe items were called knowledge probes. Those items 
were standardized phrases that related to details of the completed tasks. Hence, 
the knowledge probes were known only to the truth tellers who experienced the 
events (e.g., the description of slime for the feet: “white slime”). Liars had no 
access to knowledge about these items. Consequently, truth tellers were expected 
to react more slowly and less accurately than liars to these items. Knowledge 
probes were not essential for the credibility assessment via Credibility-CIT. 
Instead, they served as a manipulation check to test whether knowing participants 
react systematically to probe items at all. 
Credibility-CIT procedure. Participants first had to memorize 20 target 
items. Each target was presented on the screen for 7,000 ms. The target items’ 
order was randomized to avoid primacy and recency effects. After the targets 
were shown, participants had to write down all memorized terms. The learning 
phase and free recall were repeated three times. During the following RT 
procedure, targets, irrelevant items, and probes were presented in a randomized 
order on the screen. The question “Do you know this term?” was shown above 
each item. The participants’ task was to press the button for “yes” whenever a 
memorized term (target item) occurred and the button for “no” for all other 
stimuli (irrelevant items and both kinds of probe items). This oddball paradigm, 
in combination with the question “Do you know this term?”, induced a stimulus-
response incompatibility on probe items for truth tellers and liars. After a 
maximum response frame of 800 ms, the error message “too slow” occurred. 
There was a randomly varying inter-stimulus interval of 1,500, 1,750, or 2,000 
ms after each item. Every item was presented only once in accordance with 
findings on the disadvantages of item repetition in the CIT (Ben-Shakhar & 
Elaad, 2002, 2003). Prior to the test, three practice trials were conducted. In 
contrast to the actual test phase, an error message appeared when the wrong 
button was pushed and no response deadline existed. These practice trials were 
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followed by three training trials with the same conditions as in the actual task. 
Practice and training trials were not included in the data analysis.  
Scoring 
For the RT scoring, a difference score (hereafter called the RT score) was 
calculated by subtracting the mean RT of irrelevant items from the mean RT of 
probe items. High RT scores indicate large RTs on the critical probe items and 
therefore good discrimination efficiency of the Credibility-CIT. Only responses 
above 200 ms were included in the calculations. Since latency measures have to 
deal with the participants’ trade-off between speed and accuracy, wrong 
(incorrect button pressed) or too slow (> 800 ms) responses were replaced with 
a penalty score. This penalty was calculated by the mean of correct responses 
plus twice the standard deviation (M + 2SD) of the corresponding item category 
(probe or irrelevant). This error treatment procedure was adopted from a 
systematic evaluation of scoring algorithms for the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) and has proven to be one of the best-performing procedures for the IAT to 
interpret error trials in the RT-based score (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  
For the calculation of error rates, pressing the wrong button or reaching the 
response deadline of 800 ms was counted as an error. Again, a difference score 
was determined by subtracting the percentage of errors on irrelevant items from 
the percentage of errors on probe items (the result is hereafter called the error 
score). High error scores indicate inaccurate responding to probe items. Target 
items were not included in the calculations. 
Reliability Estimations 
To estimate the reliability of the RT scores, the item set was divided into 
two halves of equal size. Since items were presented randomly in the CIT, order 
effects can be ruled out. A difference score was calculated for each half of the 
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item set (mean RT for half of the probe items – mean RT for half of the irrelevant 
items). The two RT difference scores served as items for the reliability 
estimation. The same procedure was used for error scores: the mean error rate on 
irrelevant items was subtracted from the mean error rate on probe items for both 
halves of the test. The two error difference scores were used for the reliability 
estimation. 
Results 
Truth tellers (n = 27) and liars (n = 28) did not differ in gender distribution 
(χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .95) or age (t(52) = 0.77, p = .45; for one participant, 
information on age was not available).  
RT Scores for Credibility Probes 
Since a difference score was used (probes minus irrelevant items, see 
Method), an RT score around zero indicates similar RTs for probes and irrelevant 
items. Truth tellers’ RT scores (M = 5.93, SD = 42.50) did not differ from zero 
(t(26) = 0.73, p = .48) but liars’ RT scores (M = 31.94, SD = 51.31) were 
significantly above zero (t(27) = 3.29, p < .01). Liars’ mean RTs significantly 
increased for credibility probes but truth tellers did not show a difference. A two-
way ANOVA was calculated to test for the influences of credibility (truth teller 
or liar), role (victim or offender), and their interaction (credibility × role) on the 
RT score for credibility probes (for descriptive statistics, see Table 2). 
Participants’ RT scores for these customized items differed between truth tellers 
and liars (F(1, 51) = 4.12, p < .05, η2 = .08) with liars producing larger RTs than 
truth tellers. Participants’ role (F(1, 51) = 0.09, p = .77, η2 = .01) and the 
interaction term (F(1, 51) = 0.17, p = .68, η2 = .01) did not show significant 
effects.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times and Error Rates by Experimental 
Groups. 
   Truth Tellers 
n = 27 
 Liars 
n = 28 
  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Reaction Times (in 
milliseconds) 
      
Credibility probe items  559.06 (58.81)  602.71 (70.95) 
Knowledge probe items  583.43 (69.28)  576.77 (85.32) 
Irrelevant items  553.13 (49.24)  570.77 (64.37) 
Target items  662.11 (57.10)  672.21 (58.10) 
RT score for credibility probes  5.93 (42.50)  31.94 (51.31) 
RT score for knowledge probes 30.30 (47.03)  6.00 (46.12) 
Error Rates (in %)       
Credibility probe items  7.78 (10.50)  13.21 (10.90) 
Knowledge probe items  12.96 (11.03)  11.79 (12.19) 
Irrelevant items  5.69 (4.44)  7.99 (6.51) 
Target items  26.67 (11.60)  29.46 (15.30) 
Error score for credibility 
probes 
 2.08 (9.40)  5.22 (10.88) 
Error score for knowledge 
probes 
 7.27 (9.98)  3.79 (9.24) 
Note. Wrong or too slow responses were replaced with a penalty score (see 
Method section). RT score = RT on probe items - RT on irrelevant items. Error 
score = Errors on probe items - errors on irrelevant items. Response deadline was 
set to 800 ms. 
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The main effect of credibility is of special interest, since the difference 
between liars and truth tellers is the central distinction to be made in credibility 
assessment. The RT Score yielded a reliability of rtt = .27. A t-test indicated that 
truth tellers and liars differed in their RT scores with a medium effect size of d = 
0.55 (t(53) = 2.04, p < .05). Moreover, a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis was calculated to test for the Credibility-CIT’s efficiency to discriminate 
truth tellers from liars. In ROC analyses, a test’s true positive rate (sensitivity) is 
plotted against the false positive rate (1 - specificity). An area under the curve 
(AUC) of .50 indicates a diagnostic value at chance level and an AUC = 1.00 
indicates perfect discrimination of a test. For the Credibility-CIT, the ROC 
analysis yielded a result of AUC = .66 that significantly differed from chance 
level (p < .05, CI [.52; .81]) indicating the Credibility-CIT’s ability to 
significantly discriminate truth tellers from liars.  
Error Scores for Credibility Probes 
Error scores were also calculated as difference scores, with scores above 
zero indicating more errors for credibility probe items than for irrelevant items 
(rtt = .20 for error scores). Error scores for liars significantly differed from zero 
(M = 5.22, SD = 10.88, t(27) = 2.54, p < .05), whereas truth tellers’ error score 
equaled zero (M = 2.08, SD = 9.40, t(26) = 1.15, p = .26), indicating that liars 
reacted less accurately to credibility probes than to irrelevant items, but truth 
tellers did not react systematically. However, ROC analyses (AUC = .61, p = .14, 
CI [.46; .77]) and the two-way ANOVA indicated that error scores for credibility 
probes did not differ between the two credibility groups (F(1, 51) = 1.39, p = .24, 
η2 = .03). Additionally, participants’ role (victim vs. offender; F(1, 51) = 0.80, p 
= .38, η2 = .02) and the interaction term (credibility × role; F(1, 51) = 0.01, p = 
.91, η2 = .01) had no significant influence. 
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RT Scores for Knowledge Probes 
The standardized knowledge probes served as a manipulation check. They 
comprised terms that were only known to truth-telling participants because those 
participants actually experienced the events. In support of the hypothesis, truth 
tellers reacted systematically on knowledge probes; their RT scores differed from 
zero (M = 30.30, SD = 47.03, t(26) = 3.35, p < .01). As expected, liars’ RT scores 
equaled zero (M = 6.00, SD = 46.12, t(27) = 0.69, p = .50). Moreover, the ROC 
curve indicated a significant area under the curve of AUC = .66 (p < .05, CI [.51; 
.80]). That means, with a probability of 66%, the RT-CIT ranks a truth teller as 
reacting more slowly on knowledge probes than a liar. The RT Score’s reliability 
for knowledge probes was rtt = .25. 
Error Scores for Knowledge Probes 
Error scores for knowledge probes were significantly above zero for both 
truth tellers (M = 7.27, SD = 9.98, t(26) = 3.79, p < .01) and liars (M = 3.79, SD 
= 9.24, t(27) = 2.17, p < .05). Hence, participants in both experimental groups 
reacted systematically more inaccurately to knowledge probes than to irrelevant 
items. Means on these error scores did not differ between the groups (AUC = 
.60, p = .19, CI [.45; .75]). Error scores for knowledge probes yielded a reliability 
of rtt = .26. 
Discussion 
Analyses indicate that truth tellers and liars show different RT patterns in 
the Credibility-CIT. The slowing of responses caused by testimony-based 
credibility probes (rather than irrelevant items) was significantly stronger in liars 
than in truth tellers. I call this the Credibility-CIT effect. In contrast, error scores 
did not differ between the groups, as has been frequently found in studies on the 
classic CIT, too (Seymour & Fraynt, 2009; Verschuere et al., 2010).  
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One could assume that the stronger Credibility-CIT effect in liars is simply 
due to a better retention rate (Carmel et al., 2003). Truth tellers might have 
forgotten details of the experience, whereas liars remembered phrases of their 
lies well. However, this explanation is not sufficient. Since credibility probe 
items consist of phrases that the participants personally stated during their 
testimonies, the participants must have consciously encoded these event-related 
details. However, this does not necessarily mean that they remember the items 
after the one-week delay before the Credibility-CIT was administered. Since the 
items referred to the most central details of the statement – items that are usually 
remembered well (Gamer et al., 2010) – forgetting is not likely. Rather, during 
item presentation different cognitive processes might be activated, inducing 
distinct orienting responses. For fabricating the story, liars memorized the given 
background information, related it to cognitive scripts, took notes on their story, 
and concentrated on word choice. In doing so, the relevant terms were encoded 
intentionally, semantically, and therefore more elaborately (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). In contrast, truth tellers experienced events and just recalled them. Hence, 
their credibility probes were encoded incidentally, at a sensory level, and 
consequently shallowly.  
Considering the knowledge probes, truth tellers reacted systematically but 
liars did not. This manipulation check indicates that the CIT was generally 
sensitive to discriminate probes from irrelevant items. Thereby findings on the 
classic CIT were replicated, showing longer RTs for a knowing than for an 
unknowing group (Hu, Evans, Wu, Lee, & Fu, 2013; Noordraven & Verschuere, 
2013; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000; Suchotzki, Verschuere, Peth, 
Crombez, & Gamer, 2015; Verschuere, Crombez, Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010; 
Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou, 2015; Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-
Petra, 2012).  
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A limitation to the results are the low reliabilities of the RT scores and error 
scores. It is a common finding that internal consistencies for mean RTs (here, RT 
rates) are good to excellent, whereas RT difference scores often produce low 
internal consistencies (Miller & Ulrich, 2013; Waechter & Stolz, 2015). A study 
by Miller and Ulrich (2013) used a model based on classical test theory to 
investigate the psychometric properties of RT rates and RT difference scores. 
They found that difference scores are much stronger influenced by item number 
than often assumed. For raw RT rates, ten items tend to produce good internal 
consistencies, while for RT difference scores hundreds are needed for 
reliabilities exceeding .80 (Miller & Ulrich, 2013). In the present study, the small 
number of 10 probe-irrelevant differences is a limitation from a psychometric 
point of view. However, in the context of CITs, increasing the item number can 
lead to habituation, strategic responses, and exerting countermeasures (Suchotzki 
et al., 2017). Therefore, lengthening the Credibility-CIT in future studies is a 
threat to its validity. Only few papers on the classic CIT report reliability 
estimations at all. An exception is the study by Noordraven and Verschuere 
(2013) reporting split-half reliabilities of r = .38 and .55 for their probe-irrelevant 
difference scores in a RT-based CIT. These values exceed the reliabilities found 
in the Credibility-CIT only slightly. 
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Study 2 – Replication with a High School Sample 
 
Credibility assessment is mainly commissioned in court when the alleged 
victim is a child or adolescent. Therefore, Study 2 was conducted to test whether 
the results of the first study could be replicated in a sample with younger 
participants. Visu-Petra, Jurje, Ciornei, and Visu-Petra (2016) indicated that the 
RT-CIT is applicable in young children (7-10 years old). Hence, I expected the 
Credibility-CIT to discriminate adolescent liars from truth tellers, too. Moreover, 
a control group was added in order to compare an unknowing group with the two 
experimental conditions and to rule out the possibility that properties of the 
idiographic probe items drive the effect. Finally, intelligence was assessed as a 
potential moderator.  
Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of N = 134 pupils of a German comprehensive school 
(Gesamtschule). They participated voluntarily during their school lessons and 
the parents gave informed consent for participation (see Appendix F, p. 121). As 
in Study 1, participants were excluded if they made more than 30% errors on 
irrelevant items or more than 60% on target items (n = 10). The final sample 
included N = 124 participants (58.1% female) with a mean age of M = 16.73 
years (SD = 1.44, range: 14-19 years). This sample was divided into three groups 
with n = 45 truth tellers (22 offenders, 23 victims), n = 51 liars (26 offenders, 25 
victims), and n = 28 control group participants. Truth tellers, liars, and the control 
group did not differ in gender distribution (χ2(2) = 3.93, p = .14) or age (F(2, 
121) = 0.68, p = .51). 
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Procedure 
The procedure and scoring algorithm were similar to those used in Study 1 
apart from the following modifications: With regard to the younger age of the 
participants, some of the tasks were replaced (e.g., the tasks with sexual content). 
The participant’s instructions to either fabricate stories or experience the tasks 
can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B (p. 110 and p. 116, respectively). 
Moreover, the maximum response frame was extended to 1,200 ms and the 
number of probe items was increased to 15 credibility and 15 knowledge probes 
with regard to the low internal consistencies found in Study 1. Finally, a control 
group was added. The control group did not participate in the first session of the 
experiment (neither fabricated stories nor experienced the actions and thus were 
not interviewed). Therefore, they did not gain any knowledge about the actions 
and accordingly should not react systematically on either knowledge or 
credibility probes. Each control group participant responded to the item set of 
one randomly assigned experimental group participant. Intelligence was tested 
after the RT-CIT procedure was completed. 
Intelligence 
Cognitive abilities were measured using two subtests of the LPS-2 
(Leistungsprüfsystem-2; Kreuzpointner, Lukesch, & Horn, 2013), which is 
constructed along the intelligence conception by Carroll (1993, 2005). Since data 
collection was conducted during school lessons, time constraints did not allow 
for an extensive IQ test. The subtest general knowledge (α = .89) was used to 
measure crystallized intelligence; in this subtest, spelling errors shall be detected 
in a list of words under time constraints. A second subtest was consulted to 
assesses cognitive speediness (α = .81); here, certain signs must be found in a list 
and crossed out under time constraints. Since norm data were not available for 
the subtests, participants’ raw scores were transformed into IQ scores by 
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standardization within the final sample. Congruent with the test’s norm data, 
standardization was performed for two age groups separately (14-16 and 17-19 
years). 
Results 
RT Scores for Credibility Probes 
As in Study 1, difference scores were calculated with means above zero 
indicating larger RTs on credibility probe items than on irrelevant items. The RT 
score’s reliability was rtt = .39. Participants in all experimental groups reacted 
systematically to credibility probes (liars: t(50) = 7.22, p < .01; truth tellers: t(44) 
= 6,90, p < .01; control group: t(27) = 3.85, p < .01; for descriptive statistics, see 
Table 3). The RT score for credibility probes differed across truth tellers, liars, 
and the control group (F(2, 121) = 6.15, p < .01, η2 = .09). Post hoc comparisons 
using REGWQ’s test indicated that liars reacted more slowly to their customized 
credibility probes than truth tellers and the control group did. Truth tellers and 
the control group did not differ with regards to their RTs.  
For credibility assessment, discriminating truth tellers from liars is 
essential. Focusing on the comparison between these two groups, the two-way 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for credibility (truth teller vs. liar, F(1, 
92) = 4.29, p < .05) with liars showing a larger RT score than truth tellers on 
credibility probes. As expected, the main effect of role (victim vs. offender) was 
non-significant (F(1, 92) = 0.27, p = .61), as was the interaction term (F(1, 92) = 
0.72, p = .40). As in Study 1, it was possible to classify truth tellers and liars 
based on their RTs on the personalized credibility probes (t(94) = -2.07, p < .05, 
d = 0.42; AUC = .62 (CI [.50; .73], p < .05).  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times and Error Rates by Experimental 
Group. 
  Truth Tellers 
n = 45 
 Liars 
n = 51 
 Control Group 
n = 25 
  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Reaction Times (in 
milliseconds) 
         
Credibility probe items  777.52 (117.33)  817.92 (147.11)  735.77 (98.28) 
Knowledge probe items  765.20 (126.53)  745.74 (119.82)  711.25 (109.24) 
Irrelevant items  723.25 (95.26)  733.66 (100.39)  703.76 (83.75) 
Target items  817.98 (111.28)  824.70 (117.73)  786.69 (88.46) 
RT score for credibility 
probes 
 54.27 (52.77)  84.26 (83.40)  32.01 (44.02) 
RT score for knowledge 
probes 
 41.94 (69.89)  12.08 (52.02)  7.49 (51.20) 
Error Rates (in %)          
Credibility probe items  9.93 (13.53)  12.68 (14.68)  5.00 (7.62) 
Knowledge probe items  9.63 (13.53)  4.84 (7.07)  2.86 (5.86) 
Irrelevant items  4.14 (5.17)  4.29 (5.30)  2.63 (4.58) 
Target items  21.11 (13.69)  21.57 (15.38)  15.18 (10.67) 
Error score for 
credibility probes 
 5.79 (10.75)  8.39 (11.33)  2.37 (6.15) 
Error score for 
knowledge probes 
 5.49 (10.03)  0.55 (5.45)  0.22 (3.23) 
Note. Wrong or too slow responses were replaced with a penalty score (see 
Method section). RT score = RT on probe items - RT on irrelevant items. Error 
score = Errors on probe items - errors on irrelevant items. Response deadline was 
set to 1,200 ms. 
Study 2 – Replication with a High School Sample 
 49 
Error Scores for Credibility Probes 
Liars and truth tellers showed error scores that were significantly higher 
than zero for credibility probes (liars: t(50) = 5.29, p < .01; truth tellers: t(44) = 
3.61, p < .01). The control group did not show systematic error scores (t(27) = 
2.04, p = .05; but note that the significance level was only missed slightly). The 
ANOVA yielded significant differences among liars, truth tellers, and the control 
group (F(2, 121) = 3.20, p < .05, η2 = .05). However, REGWQ’s post hoc test 
did not indicate differences in the error scores of the three groups. The ROC 
analysis showed that error scores did not significantly discriminate truth tellers 
from liars (AUC = .60, CI [.48; .71], p = .10). The error score’s reliability was rtt 
= .32. 
RT Scores for Knowledge Probes 
As in Study 1, knowledge probe items comprised information that was only 
known to the truth telling participants. The reliability of the RT score for 
knowledge probes was rtt = .28. Truth tellers showed RT scores that were 
significantly larger than zero when responding to knowledge probes as compared 
to irrelevant items. In contrast, the liars’ and control group’s RT did not slow 
down (truth tellers: t(44) = 4.03, p < .01; liars: t(50) = 1.66, p = .10; control 
group: t(27) = 0.77, p = .45). The three groups differed in their RT scores 
(F(2, 121) = 4.14, p < .05, η2 = 0.06). As predicted, planned comparisons 
revealed that participants possessing knowledge (truth tellers) reacted 
significantly more slowly on knowledge probes than did the two unknowing 
groups (liars and the control group; t(121) = 2.87, p < .01), indicating a successful 
manipulation check. 
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Error Scores for Knowledge Probes 
Error scores for knowledge probes yielded a reliability of rtt = .24. Error 
scores differed from zero for knowing participants (truth tellers: t(44) = 3.67, p 
< .01), but the unknowing participants did not react systematically (liars: t(50) = 
0.72, p = .48; control group: t(27) = 0.37, p = .72). The ANOVA showed that RT 
scores differed significantly across the three groups (F(2, 121) = 7.18, p < .01, 
η2 = .11). Planned comparisons indicated that truth tellers had higher error scores 
on knowledge probes than the unknowing groups did (liars and control group; 
t(53.53) = 3.24, p < .01). 
Moderation by Intelligence 
Multiple regression analyses were used to test whether the experimental 
effects were moderated by trait intelligence. Credibility (truth teller or liar), 
crystallized intelligence, cognitive speediness, and the corresponding interaction 
terms (credibility × crystallized intelligence; credibility × cognitive speediness; 
credibility × crystallized intelligence × cognitive speediness) were entered into 
the regression equation with the RT score or error score for credibility probes as 
dependent variables (Table 4). All variables were centered. Congruent with the 
results presented above, credibility predicted the RT score but not the error score 
for credibility probes. Crystallized intelligence and cognitive speediness did not 
moderate the Credibility-CIT responses. 
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Table 4 
Moderation by Intelligence. 
  RT Score  Error Score  
  R2 = .07  R2 = .04 
Predictors  β p  β p 
Credibility (Truth Teller vs. Liar)  .22 < .05  .12 .27 
Crystallized Intelligence  .11 .30  -.02 .89 
Interaction (Credibility × Cryst. 
Intelligence)  .01 .99  .05 .62 
Cognitive Speediness  .11 .32  .14 .20 
Interaction (Credibility × Cogn. 
Speediness)  .07 .50  .03 .78 
3-Way Interaction (Credibility × Cryst. 
Intell. × Cogn. Speediness)  
.02 .87  .04 .73 
Note. N = 96. All scores z-transformed. 
Discussion 
Regarding the credibility probes, the results found in Study 1 were 
replicated in an independent and younger sample. Liars showed slower RTs on 
credibility probes (as compared to irrelevant items) than truth tellers or the 
control group did. As compared to Study 1, reliabilities of the RT score were 
descriptively higher in Study 2 (rtt Study 1 = .27 vs. rtt Study 2 = .39), while the 
Credibility-CIT’s diagnostic value was slightly lower (dStudy 1 = 0.55 vs. dStudy 2 = 
0.42). It is reasonable that lengthening the test from 10 to 15 probe items 
influenced these results. As Suchotzki et al. (2017) considered, a larger number 
of probe items can induce habituation and the practicing of countermeasures 
which reduces the test’s validity. 
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RT scores of the control group and the truth tellers were similar, which 
contradicted the initial hypothesis. However, the most probable explanation is 
that the control group gained knowledge about the tasks. Since the study was 
conducted at a school it is not unlikely that the students were curious and chatted 
about their experience of participation in the study. If this was the case, the 
control group would represent a shallow encoding group and similarities with 
truth tellers could be interpreted in the light of the Credibility-CIT’s theory. 
However, a replication with a control group without any knowledge about the 
critical tasks is necessary. 
No influence or interaction effect of crystallized intelligence or cognitive 
speediness on the Credibility-CIT was found. Therefore, even participants with 
high intelligence scores were not capable of manipulating their responses in the 
task. A limiting factor is, however, that due to time constraints only two subtests 
instead of a whole IQ test were conducted.  
Considering the knowledge probes, truth tellers reacted more slowly and 
more inaccurately on these standardized items than did participants in the 
unknowing groups (liars and the control group), confirming a successful 
manipulation check as in Study 1. However, for future studies omission of these 
knowledge probes is advisable. In the present study design, truth tellers and liars 
had a different base rate of probe items. Participants with knowledge (truth 
tellers) see both kinds of probe items (knowledge probes and credibility probes) 
as critical. In contrast, for liars only the credibility probes induce a cognitive 
conflict. Studies show that the proportion of probe compared to irrelevant items 
is crucial for the CIT (Suchotzki, Verschuere, et al., 2015). To equalize this, an 
exclusive Credibility-CIT without knowledge probe items should be conducted 
in future studies. 
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Study 3 – Omission of Knowledge Probes 
 
As discussed in Study 2, there is evidence that the knowledge probes could 
influence the CIT effect by placing different demands on truth tellers and liars. 
Hence, Study 3 was conducted to test whether the Credibility-CIT works when 
knowledge probes are omitted. Moreover, participants were younger than in 
Study 1 and Study 2. With regard to the application of a CIT for children, I 
expected the Credibility-CIT to show responses that differentiated between 
groups in a younger sample, too. As in Study 2, an unknowing control group was 
used and was expected to show non-specific responses to credibility probe items.  
Method 
Sample 
A sample of 150 school students participated in Study 3. Again, participants 
with more than 30% errors on irrelevant items or 60% errors on targets were 
excluded from the calculations (n = 11). The final sample consisted of n = 139 
students (40% female; age: M = 13.42 years, SD = 0.98, range 11-16 years). 
Truth tellers (n = 54), liars (n = 60), and the control group (n = 25) did not differ 
in gender distribution (χ2(2) = 0.25, p = .88) or age (F(2, 138) = 0.37, p = .69).  
Procedure and Scoring 
To keep the sample diverse, Study 3 was conducted at two schools (German 
Gymnasium and Realschule) and a summer academy for mathematically talented 
high school students. The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1 and Study 
2. Stimuli were 15 probes, 15 targets, and 60 irrelevant items. With consideration 
for the participants’ younger age, the response deadline was extended to 1,800 
ms. Scoring was the same as in Study 1 and Study 2 (difference score: RT for 
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probes – RT for irrelevant items). Again, only responses that were faster than 
200 ms were included in the calculations. Wrong or too slow responses (> 1,800 
ms) were replaced with a penalty score (M + 2SD). 
Intelligence 
Crystallized intelligence was assessed in more detail than in Study 2. The 
subtests general knowledge and anagrams from the LPS-2 (Kreuzpointner et al., 
2013), as well as the subtest word fluency of the PSB-R 6-13 (Horn, 2003), were 
averaged to an overall score of crystallized intelligence. Cognitive speediness 
was measured with the same subtest of the LPS-2 as in Study 2 (Kreuzpointner 
et al., 2013). As in Study 2, participants’ raw scores were transformed into IQ 
scores by standardization within the final sample for two age groups separately 
(in this case, ages 11-13 and 14-16 years). 
Results 
RT Scores for Credibility Probes 
Consistent with the hypothesis, truth tellers and liars reacted differentially 
on credibility probes (t(53) = 5.20, p < .01 and t(59) = 5.82, p < .01, respectively), 
but the control group’s RT score did not differ from zero (t(24) = 1.56, p = .13; 
for further descriptive statistics, see Table 5; reliability for RT score: rtt = .55). 
The ANOVA showed that the three groups differed in their RT scores (F(2, 136) 
= 3.59, p < .05), but post hoc tests indicated that only the control group differed 
from the two experimental groups; truth tellers (M = 86.58, SD = 122.33) and 
liars (M = 93.59, SD = 124.49) showed similar RT scores (t(112) = -0.30, p = 
.76). This contradicted the hypothesis and the results found in the two previous 
studies.  
Regarding the influence of the participant’s role (victim vs. offender), the 
two-way ANOVA showed no significant main effects of either credibility (truth 
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teller vs. liar, F(1, 110) = 0.06, p = .80) or role (victim vs. offender; F(1, 110) = 
0.08, p = .77), and also no significant interaction effect (F(1, 110) = 1.18, p = 
.28). 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times and Error Rates by Experimental 
Groups. 
  Truth Tellers 
n = 54 
 Liars 
n = 60 
 Control Group 
n = 25 
  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Reaction Times  
(in milliseconds) 
         
Credibility probe 
items 
 1,009.60 (253.49)  1,028.52 (238.56)  906.72 (205.07) 
Irrelevant items  923.02 (180.62)  934.93 (186.63)  884.54 (165.27) 
Target items  996.93 (190.62)  1,020.61 (202.22)  1,020.69 (184.64) 
RT score   86.58 (122.33)  93.59 (124.49)  22.18 (71.03) 
Error Rates  
(in %) 
         
Credibility probe 
items 
 9.26 (17.63)  11.33 (19.34)  2.67 (5.09) 
Irrelevant items  4.75 (7.68)  4.81 (7.08)  2.27 (2.76) 
Target items  16.42 (14.40)  18.33 (14.61)  18.13 (12.98) 
Error score   4.51 (13.10)  6.53 (14.68)  0.40 (4.06) 
Note. Wrong or too slow responses were replaced with a penalty score (see 
Method section). RT score = RT on probe items - RT on irrelevant items. Error 
score = Errors on probe items - errors on irrelevant items. Response deadline was 
set to 1,800 ms. 
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It was striking that the standard deviations in this sample were twice as large 
as in Study 2. This might be related to the response deadline of 1,800 ms, which 
was larger than in Study 1 (800 ms) and Study 2 (1,200 ms). To explore this 
assumption, the response frame included in the calculations was trimmed post 
hoc. Table 6 shows that narrowing down the response interval improved the 
Credibility-CIT’s detection efficiency. Trimming the response frame after 
1,400 ms or 1,200 ms led to better classification efficiency of the CIT (d = 0.25 
in both cases). Narrowing down the response interval is accompanied by an 
exclusion of the valid trials above the limitation criterion. Consequently, a too-
strict restriction (up to 1,000 or 800 ms) led to a decline of valid trials (< 75 %) 
and hence to a poorer classification efficiency. Overall, even with the 1,400 or 
1,200 ms deadlines, the RT scores of truth tellers and liars did still not differ 
significantly.  
Table 6  
RT scores for trimmed response frames. 
Response 
Frame  
 Valid 
Trials  
(in %) 
 Truth Tellers   Liars  t-test  p 
M (SD) M (SD) 
 [200; 1,800 ms]  100  86.58 (122.33) 93.59 (124.49) t(112) = -0.30 .76 
 [200; 1,600 ms]  98  69.39 (93.23) 82.07 (97.58) t(112) = -0.71 .48 
 [200; 1,400 ms]  95  56.41 (79.03) 77.84 (88.74) t(112) = -1.36 .18 
 [200; 1,200 ms]  89  39.74 (63.39) 56.41 (70.30) t(112) = -1.32 .19 
 [200; 1,000 ms]  73  17.61 (50.13) 29.17 (48.61) t(110) = -1.24 .22 
 [200; 800 ms]  43  13.65 (37.39) 15.37 (49.61) t(101) = -0.20 .84 
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Error Scores for Credibility Probes 
Error scores (rtt = .60) were significantly higher than zero for truth tellers 
(t(53) = 2.53, p < .05) and liars (t(59) = 3.44, p < .01), while the control group 
did not show systematic error scores (t(24) = 0.49, p = .63). The ANOVA 
indicated that error scores were similar for truth tellers (M = 4.51, SD = 13.10), 
liars (M = 6.53, SD = 14.68), and the control group (M = 0.40, SD = 4.06; F(2, 
136) = 2.03, p = .14). 
Moderation by Intelligence 
Table 7 shows the results of the moderator analysis with RT score and error 
score as dependent variables. For exploratory purposes, the moderation was also 
calculated with the trimmed RT score [200; 1,400 ms]. However, results between 
the trimmed and untrimmed RT score differed only marginally. Overall, 
crystallized intelligence was not significantly related to the Credibility-CIT’s 
classification efficiency (β ≤ .09, p ≥ .35). However, a high cognitive speediness 
was related to a lower error score (β = -.24, p < .05). The interaction between 
credibility (truth teller vs. liar) and cognitive speediness was not meaningfully 
related to the RT scores or error scores (β = -.03, p < .73). Hence, the CIT’s 
detection efficiency was unaffected by cognitive speediness. 
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Table 7 
Moderation by Intelligence. 
  RT Score  
Trimmed  
RT Score  
[200; 1,400 
ms]  Error Score 
  R2 = .03  R2 = .03  R2 = .06 
Predictors  β p  β p  β p 
Credibility (Truth Teller vs. Liar)  .02 .87  .14 .18  .08 .44 
Crystallized Intelligence  .04 .69  .09 .35  .01 .90 
Interaction (Credibility × Cryst. 
Intelligence) 
 .02 .85  .06 .53  .03 .74 
Cognitive Speediness  -.13 .19  -.06 .57  -.24 < .05 
Interaction (Credibility × Cogn. 
Speediness) 
 .06 .56  .01 .96  -.03 .73 
3-Way Interaction (Credibility × 
Cryst. Intell. × Cogn. Speediness) 
 .07 .47  .03 .80  -.01 .95 
Note. N = 114. All scores z-transformed. 
Discussion 
In contrast to the results found in Study 1 and Study 2, truth tellers and liars 
did not differ in their RT scores in the Credibility-CIT. There are three apparent, 
possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the sample might have been too 
young to deal with the task. However, since error rates in this study were 
comparable to those found in the two previous studies (compare Table 2, Table 
3, and Table 5), task difficulty seems an unlikely explanation. Moreover, a study 
by Visu-Petra et al. (2016) showed that the classic CIT works even for children 
aged between seven and ten years. Overall, the sample’s age is probably not the 
cause of the insignificant results.  
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The second and more likely explanation concerns the extended response 
deadline of the Credibility-CIT. Seymour et al. (2000) emphasize the necessity 
of a speeded CIT to avoid strategic responses. They argue that a response 
deadline around 1,000 ms forces the participant to react automatically – solely 
based on familiarity or significance – and not consciously. As initially described, 
this dichotomous classification between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli induces 
the stimulus-response incompatibility that is essential for a CIT’s detection 
efficiency. Post hoc trimming of the response deadline indicated that a narrower 
response frame improves the CIT’s detection efficiency. Still, RT scores did not 
differ between truth tellers and liars. It remains unclear to what extend response 
deadlines can influence CIT effects. To the best of my knowledge, studies 
systematically evaluating the impact of different response deadlines for the CIT 
do not exist so far. Not only the classic CIT but also the Credibility-CIT would 
benefit from further examination of that topic.  
A third explanation concerns the omission of knowledge probes. 
Knowledge probes led to a dissimilar proportion of familiar and unfamiliar items 
between truth tellers and liars in Study 1 and Study 2. Since the item proportion 
is crucial for a CIT’s detection efficiency (Suchotzki, Verschuere, et al., 2015) 
this might have triggered the effect. Hence, future studies should again replicate 
the Credibility-CIT without including knowledge probes.  
Regarding the influence of intelligence, neither cognitive speediness nor 
crystallized intelligence moderated the CIT’s detection efficiency. On the one 
hand, this corresponds to the results found in Study 2. On the other hand, this 
lack of moderation by intelligence is likely to be related to the invalid overall 
effect of the experimental group. Hence, substantial conclusions cannot be drawn 
from this finding. 
The control group’s unsystematic responses indicate that probe items do not 
comprise characteristics other than irrelevant items. The study’s design and 
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aspects of the participants’ anonymity did not allow for separating the control 
groups for truth tellers and liars. A within-subjects design – with each 
experimental group and control group participants undergoing a truth telling and 
lying condition – could solve this issue. This was done in Study 4. 
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Study 4 – Within-Subjects Design and EEG 
 
Study 4 was conducted to test the Credibility-CIT using a within-
participants design with each participant undergoing both a lying and truth-
telling condition. With regard to the issues of the control groups in Study 2 and 
Study 3, a control group that responded to truth-related and lie-related item sets 
was included. Study 1 and Study 2 did not show differences between victims and 
offenders in their CIT responses. Hence, in Study 4, all participants were 
instructed by an experimenter instead of another participant. As in Study 3, 
knowledge probes were omitted to test whether item proportions drove the effect 
found in Study 1 and Study 2.  
Beyond the already replicated results of the RT-based Credibility-CIT, 
applying a psychophysiological measure seemed promising. Since studies with 
the classic CIT show that event-related potentials (ERPs) have a good 
classification efficiency (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Meijer, Smulders, 
Merckelbach, & Wolf, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2011; Suchotzki, Crombez, Smulders, 
Meijer, & Verschuere, 2015), EEG data should also be useful for the Credibility-
CIT.  
In addition, cognitive functions and personality traits were assessed to 
facilitate examination of individual differences in the responsiveness to the 
Credibility-CIT. Working memory might be related to the Credibility-CIT’s 
detection efficiency, since working memory is involved in information 
processing and decision making. Given that attentional processes comprise the 
ability to focus on task-relevant stimuli while ignoring distractors, this capability 
might also be related to inhibiting deceitful responses in the CIT. Considering 
personality traits, studies have shown associations between the ability to inhibit 
task-irrelevant reactions and extraversion (in a Stroop task; Prabhakaran, 
Kraemer, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). No significant relations between CIT and 
The Credibility-CIT 
 62 
the propensity towards anxiety occurred (Visu-Petra et al., 2012). Moreover, 
psychopathy seems to be associated with hyporesponsivity (Verschuere, 
Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 2005; Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, & De 
Clercq, 2007; Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, & Uzieblo, 2006). Hypo-
responsivity has been observed to be accompanied by weaker orienting responses 
and hence decreased classification accuracy in the CIT for psychopathic 
participants (for a review see Verschuere et al., 2006). 
Method 
Sample 
A sample of 78 right-handed psychology students participated voluntarily 
for course credit and gave informed consent. Compared to Study 1 and Study 2, 
participants had higher error rates on target items. Therefore, data of participants 
with more than 30% error trials on irrelevant or more than 70% on target items 
were excluded (n = 3). One participant was excluded because she did not follow 
the experimenter’s instructions. The experimental group consisted of n = 46 
students, and the control group comprised n = 28 participants (83% female; age 
M = 24.11 years, SD = 5.64). To ensure that the control group did not gain any 
knowledge about the experiment, data collection was conducted several months 
after collecting the experimental group’s data. The control group only 
participated in the RT-based Credibility-CIT; EEG data were not recorded. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted using a within-participants design. Participants 
were informed that they would have to give a statement about eight to-be-
completed tasks; four of them would truly be experienced (truth-telling 
condition) and the completion of four tasks shall be fabricated (lying condition). 
An interviewer would try to figure out which part they invented. The three most 
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convincing statements would win vouchers of 50 Euro, 30 Euro, and 20 Euro, 
respectively (approximately 55, 33, and 22 US Dollars). After a one-week delay, 
the participants were to complete and attempt to trick an EEG-based “lie 
detector”.  
It was counterbalanced whether the participants experienced the tasks or 
fabricated the story first. For the truth-telling condition, participants had to deal 
with four of the tasks as specified in Table 1 (p. 35). For the lying condition, they 
received a list with rough descriptions of four other tasks listed in Table 1; they 
had 25 minutes to fabricate a coherent story. Immediately after experiencing and 
inventing, participants were interrogated about the eight occurrences by an 
interviewer who was blind to the statements’ condition (and thus credibility). 
The control group did not participate in this phase of the experiment and was 
therefore unknowing about the tasks.  
Credibility-CIT 
Due to the within-participants design, the Credibility-CIT comprised two 
blocks – a truth block and a lie block: The truth block included 15 credibility 
probe items that were extracted from the participant’s true statement, 15 target 
items, and a randomly allocated set of 60 irrelevant items. The lie block included 
15 credibility probes that referred to the participants’ invented statements, the 
same 15 target items as in the truth block, and another randomly allocated set of 
60 irrelevant items. The order of the blocks (truth block or lie block first) was 
counterbalanced such that every participant was presented with both a truth trials 
block and a lie trials block, but the order varied. After the two blocks, the whole 
Credibility-CIT (both blocks) was repeated to obtain a stronger signal-to-noise 
ratio for the EEG. Following Study 1, which yielded the strongest results thus 
far, the response deadline was set at 800 ms per item. 
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In addition to the behavioral data (RTs and error rates), an EEG was 
recorded from 64 scalp electrodes using electrode caps (ActiCap; Brain Products, 
Gilching, Germany). Electrodes were placed according to the International 10-
10 system. Data were referenced to the mastoid electrodes TP9 and TP10. 
Impedances were kept below 10kΩ, sampling rate was 500Hz, and the band-pass 
filter was 0.1-70Hz. Eye movements were corrected for ocular artifacts as 
proposed by Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). Data were screened for 
artifacts (amplitudes exceeding ±100µV) and segmented into epochs lasting 
from 100 ms before to 1,000 ms after stimulus onset.  
Cognitive Functions and Personality Traits 
After finishing the Credibility-CIT, data for evaluating the relationship 
between individual differences in response to the CIT were collected. Selective 
attention was measured using the d2 test (Brickenkamp, 1994). The participant 
is required to cross out targets (“d”s) within several distractors (“p”s) under time 
pressure. The total number of targets marked correctly serves as a measure of 
processing. The total number of errors (distractors crossed out and targets 
omitted) is a measure of inaccuracy. The subtest digit span of the German 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (HAWIE-R; Tewes, 1991) served 
as a measure of working memory and attention. Participants must recall digits 
either in a predetermined order (digit span forward) or in reversed order (digit 
span backward). Span length served as outcome. The Big Five (extraversion, 
neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience) 
were assessed using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; Lang, Lüdtke, & Asendorpf, 
2001). The Dark Triad (psychopathy, narcissism, and machiavellianism) was 
measured using the Short Dark Triad (SD3; Jones & Paulhus, 2014). For the 
SD3, Cronbach’s alpha was insufficient in the present study (Psychopathy: 
α = .49, Narcissism: α = .69, and Machiavellianism: α = .66). The low internal 
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consistency of the Dark Triad was probably caused by a restricted score variance 
or a floor effect. 
Scoring 
As in the three previous studies, RTs and error rates were scored using 
difference scores. RT scores and error scores were calculated separately for the 
truth block and the lie block. Also, the reliability was calculated separately for 
the truth block and lie block. Data from the blocks that were repeated (to allow 
adequate data for EEG) were not included in the behavioral scores because 
studies show that detection efficiency for RTs decreases with repetition (Ben-
Shakhar & Elaad, 2002).  
Regarding the EEG, the ERP components P200, P300, and LPC (late 
positive component) at the three midline scalp sites Fz, Cz, and Pz (frontal, 
central, and parietal, respectively) were analyzed. However, findings were not 
meaningful (see Results section). Therefore, the results presented here focus only 
on the P300 component measured at Pz site, which usually produces the most 
robust effects in a CIT (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2011, 
2014; Rosenfeld, 2011). The wave forms revealed that the P300 peaked between 
580 and 700 ms after stimulus onset. Hence, the interval was calculated 
accordingly for probes, irrelevant items, and targets in both the truth block and 
lie block. Truth and lie blocks were repeated and the EEG data were averaged 
over the initial and repeated trials. 
Results 
RT Scores and Error Scores for Credibility Probes 
Consistent with the hypotheses, participants in the experimental group 
reacted systematically on the credibility probe items when they were confronted 
with lie-related items and truth-related items: The RT scores for the lie bock and 
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for the truth block were significantly higher than zero (lie block: t(45) = 6.74, 
p < .01, rtt = .32; truth block: t(45) = 4.29, p < .01, rtt = .28; for descriptive 
statistics, see Table 8). The central distinction in this study is the difference 
between truth-related and lie-related trials. Responses were stronger slowed 
down in the lie block than in the truth block (t(45) = -2.35, p < .05, d = 0.47). 
Error scores in the lie block and truth block differed from zero, too (t(45) = 
5.77, p <.01, rtt = .42 and t(45) = 3.74, p < .01, rtt = .09). The error score in the 
lie block was higher than in the truth block (t(45) = -2.22, p < .05, d = 0.41). 
Hence, RT scores and error scores differed when participants either lied or told 
the truth. 
The control group did not react systematically to the credibility probes in 
either block, as expected. RT scores in lie block and truth block did not differ 
from zero (t(27) = 0.04, p = .97 and t(27) = 0.50, p = .62, respectively). Error 
scores did not differ from zero, too (lie block: t(27) = - 0.54, p = .59; truth block: 
t(27) = -0.45, p = .66). Consistent with the hypotheses, the control group did not 
show an Credibility-CIT effect: truth and lie blocks did not differ in RT scores 
(t(27) = 0.37, p = .71) and error scores (t(27) = 0.10, p = .92).  
Moreover, the control group had a different reaction pattern than the 
experimental group. Compared to the control group, the experimental group 
showed larger RT scores (truth block: t(72) = 2.19, p < .05, d = 0.52; lie block: 
t(72) = 4.58, p < .01, d = 1.14) and larger error scores (truth block: t(72) = 2.81, 
p < .01, d = 0.70; lie block: t(72) = 4.27, p < .01, d = 1.07).  
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times and Error Rates by Experimental Condition. 
  Experimental Group n = 46  
Control Group 
n = 28 
  Truth Block  Lie Block  Truth Block  Lie Block 
  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Reaction Times (in milliseconds)             
Credibility probes  586.01 (56.39)  605.09 (60.85)  567.97 (51.94)  565.57 (55.18) 
Irrelevant items  562.62 (40.94)  562.83 (43.98)  564.31 (50.78)  565.37 (42.05) 
Target items  696.30 (57.95)  805.87 (66.15)  688.01 (67.27)  810.50 (63.67) 
RT score   23.39 (36.98)  42.26 (42.52)  3.67 (38.77)  0.20 (30.15) 
Error Rates (in %)             
Credibility probes  10.14 (8.75)  14.64 (11.21)  6.67 (7.26)  5.48 (7.71) 
Irrelevant items  5.47 (4.37)  6.16 (4.48)  7.20 (5.54)  6.19 (5.03) 
Target items  34.78 (16.74)  31.74 (15.79)  31.43 (14.61)  26.90 (12.76) 
Error score   4.67 (8.47)  8.48 (9.97)  -0.54 (6.30)  -0.71 (6.99) 
Note. Wrong or too slow responses were replaced with a penalty score (see Method section). RT score = 
RT on probe items - RT on irrelevant items. Error score = Errors on probe items - errors on irrelevant items. 
Response deadline was set to 800 ms. 
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Effects of Trial Repetition 
The blocks were repeatedly presented to the participants to obtain a stronger 
signal-to-noise ratio for the EEG. This offered the opportunity to check for the 
effects of trial repetition in the behavioral data of the Credibility-CIT. Results 
showed that the Credibility-CIT effect diminishes with block repetition. The RT 
score in the truth block (M = 24.19, SD = 32.16) and the lie block (M = 34.94, 
SD = 33.58) was similar when the RTs were averaged over the initial and 
repeated block (t(45) = -1.56, p = .13, d = 0.33). The error score also did not 
differ between lie block and truth block when items were repeated (M = 6.74, SD 
= 7.46 and M = 5.11, SD = 7.59, respectively; t(45) = -1.23, p = .23, d = 0.22). 
Cognitive Functions and Personality Traits 
Measures of individual differences were correlated with the Credibility-
CIT’s detection efficiency (Table 9). According to the previous results, a high 
detection efficiency of the Credibility-CIT is defined as higher scores in the lie 
block than the truth block. Therefore, detection efficiency was calculated as the 
difference between lie and truth block (for RT scores: RT scorelie block – RT 
scoretruth block; for error scores: error scorelie block – error scoretruth block). High scores 
indicate strong orienting towards lie-related items. 
Working inaccurately in the d2 test was significantly associated with a 
weaker detection efficiency of the Credibility-CIT (r = -.29). Moreover, higher 
scores on psychopathy were correlated with a weaker orienting towards lie-
related items in the Credibility-CIT (r = -.36). The other correlations between the 
Credibility-CIT and cognitive functions or personality traits were not 
meaningful.  
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Table 9  
Correlations between the Credibility-CIT’s Detection Efficiency, Cognitive 
Functions, and Personality Traits. 
  
Detection Efficiency 
using RT Scores 
 Detection Efficiency 
using Error Scores 
Cognitive Functions     
Digit span forward   .10   .10 
Digit span backward  -.03   .17 
Processing (d2 test)   .13   .00 
Inaccuracy (d2 test)  -.29*  -.15 
Personality Traits     
Extraversion   .16   .10 
Agreeableness   .13  -.05 
Conscientiousness   .11  -.03 
Neuroticism   .05   .01 
Openness  -.03   .04 
Narcissism  -.07   .08 
Machiavellianism  -.20  -.11 
Psychopathy  -.36*  -.15 
Note. N = 46. * p < .05. A high detection efficiency represents a 
strong orienting towards lie-related items. 
To test for individual differences in responsivity, a repeated measures 
ANCOVA was calculated with cognitive functions and personality trait variables 
as covariates (Table 10). All covariates were mean-centered. RT scores for the 
lie block and the truth block served as a repeated measures factor. Overall, the 
RT effect was independent of any covariate’s influences. However, inaccuracy 
in the d2 test and psychopathy traits nearly reached significance. 
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Table 10  
Detection Efficiency of the Credibility-CIT with Cognitive Functions and 
Personality Traits as Covariates.  
  F (1, 33)  p η2 
Within-Participants Factor     
Credibility (RT score for lie 
block vs. RT score for truth 
block)  5.06 < .05 .13 
Covariates     
Cognitive Functions     
Digit span forward  0.19 .67 .01 
Digit span backward  0.74 .40 .02 
Processing (d2 test)  0.20 .66 .01 
Inaccuracy (d2 test)   4.32 .05 .12 
Personality Traits     
Extraversion  0.42 .52 .01 
Agreeableness  0.67 .42 .02 
Conscientiousness  0.03 .85 .00 
Neuroticism  0.11 .75 .00 
Openness  0.25 .62 .01 
Narcissism  0.00 .99 .00 
Machiavellianism  0.01 .92 .00 
Psychopathy  3.25 .08 .09 
Note. N = 46. Repeated measures ANCOVA’s tests of within-participants effects 
with RT score for the lie block and RT score for the truth block as repeated 
measures factor.  
Event-Related Potentials 
The critical test of the hypothesis was whether credibility probes show 
different ERPs in lie the blocks and the and truth blocks. A paired samples t-test 
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revealed that truth blocks and lie blocks elicited similar P300 amplitudes for 
credibility probe items (t(45) = -0.30, p = .77; for descriptive statistics, see Table 
11). Hence, ERPs did not discriminate truth from lie in the Credibility-CIT. 
Further analyses indicated that probe items were processed like irrelevant items, 
which explains this lack of detection efficiency. A 3 (item category: probe vs. 
irrelevant vs. target) × 2 (credibility: truth blocks vs. lie blocks) repeated 
measures ANOVA was calculated with amplitude of the P300 component 
serving as dependent variable. There was no significant main effect of credibility 
(F(1, 45) = 1.70, p = .19, η2 = .04) and no interaction effect (credibility × item 
category; F(2, 44) = 1.60, p = .21, η2 = .07). However, a main effect of item 
category occurred (F(2, 44) = 68.68, p < .01, η2 = .76). The contrasts indicated 
that probes and irrelevant items had a similar P300 amplitude (F(1, 45) = 2.09, 
p = .15, η2 = .04), while targets elicited larger P300 components than probes (F(1, 
45) = 133.72, p < .01, η2 = .75).  
Table 11  
Descriptive Statistics for P300 Amplitudes. 
  Truth Block (i.e., truth tellers)  
Lie Block 
(i.e., liars) 
P300 Amplitudes (in µV)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
P300 on credibility probe items  3.48 (4.65)  3.60 (4.17) 
P300 on irrelevant items  4.16 (4.57)  3.99 (4.50) 
P300 on target items  12.38 (7.70)  11.35 (7.78) 
Note. N = 46. P300 component was recorded at electrode Pz. 
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Discussion 
As in Study 1 and Study 2, lying was accompanied by larger RT scores than 
truth telling. Hence, results indicating the validity of the Credibility-CIT were 
replicated for a third time. Moreover, this study was the first that indicated 
differences in error scores between truth and lie trials in a Credibility-CIT. Lie 
trials were more inaccurate than truth trials, a finding that corresponds to the 
orienting response theory.  
Different from the null-effect in Study 3, the response deadline in Study 4 
was again set to 800 ms (as in Study 1). It seems that narrower response frames 
are related to the detection efficiency of the Credibility-CIT. As in Study 3, 
knowledge probes were omitted yet results on credibility probes were still valid. 
Hence, knowledge probes were probably not the cause of the effects found in 
Study 1 and Study 2. Rather, the Credibility-CIT effect is indeed triggered by 
characteristics of the personalized credibility probes. The control group’s 
responses indicated that truth-related and lie-related credibility probes were 
processed similarly in unknowing participants. These idiographic probe items in 
cases of lying and telling the truth do not differ in content, language, or syntax – 
and consequently not in their general signal value. Due to the within-subjects 
design, systematic sample differences between the conditions (telling the truth 
versus lying) can be ruled out.  
Regarding the measures of individual differences, a strong orienting 
towards lie-related items in the Credibility-CIT was associated with accurate 
responses in the d2 test. If accurate responding in general is associated with the 
Credibility-CIT’s detection efficiency, instructions for precise responding in the 
Credibility-CIT might enhance its validity. This remains a topic for further 
research. Additionally, psychopathy was associated with a weaker orienting 
towards lie-related items. This is in line with the hyporesponsivity of persons 
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scoring high on psychopathy described by Verschuere et al. (2006). Overall, 
most of the cognitive function or personality trait variables were not significantly 
correlated to the Credibility-CIT. Hence, the essential explanation for differences 
between the experimental groups is the varying signal value of the individual 
credibility probe items.  
Considering the results of the EEG data, the P300 component peaked rather 
late (around 620 ms) compared to other studies. This effect may have been 
caused by the items’ complexity (two- or three-word phrases) since the P300 
latency is affected by stimulus evaluation (Magliero, Bashore, Coles, & Donchin, 
1984; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981). However, probe items did not induce an 
orienting response that was strong enough to elicit a P300 component at all. Data 
indicated that on a neuronal level, probes were processed like irrelevant items. 
However, the strong P300 associated with the target items showed that the EEG 
was generally sensitive to task-specific and meaningful stimuli. It remains 
unclear why the basic CIT effect (that probes induce strong P300 components) 
was not found in this study. Due to the absence of this basic effect, it is not 
surprising that ERPs did not differ between truth and lie blocks. It can be 
hypothesized that P300 amplitude’s sensitivity to different levels of encoding 
plays a role. Gamer and Berti (2012) found that in a CIT the P300 is less affected 
by depth of processing. In their study, P300 amplitudes did not differ between 
elaborately encoded (central) items and shallowly encoded (peripheral) details. 
Yet, the similar P300 components of the truth block and the lie block in the 
current study was probably rather caused by the absence of the basic effect 
(P300probes = P300irrelevants < P300tagets). Overall, it remains unclear why behavioral 
responses to probe items and irrelevant items differed (RTs and error rates) while 
they were processed similar on a neuronal level. 
Irrespective of the EEG data, the moderate effect sizes of the RT scores 
repeatedly shown in the Credibility-CIT are a promising result. Hence, it would 
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be informative to determine the overall effect found within this research project 
and to estimate the expected population effect. A meta-analysis would serve 
these purposes.
  75 
Meta-Analysis  
 
Through Studies 1 through 4, this research project aimed to develop an 
indirect measure appropriate for contexts of credibility assessment. The CIT – as 
a theoretically founded and psychometrically sound paradigm – served as a base 
for these studies. The methodological similarity of the four studies is ideal for 
meta-analytical purposes. Study 1, Study 2, and Study 4 showed that it is possible 
to discriminate truth tellers from liars using the RT-based Credibility-CIT: 
Compared to confronting participants with truth-related stimuli, presentation of 
lie-related probe items led to a larger RT difference score (RT score = RT on 
probe items – RT on irrelevant items; see Figure 2). The effect sizes found in 
Study 1, Study 2 and Study 4 were moderate. In contrast, Study 3 showed non-
significant results. Post hoc analyses indicated that this was probably caused by 
the response deadline of 1,800 ms which was larger than the response frames in 
the three meaningful studies (800 ms in Study 1 and Study 4; 1,200 ms in 
Study 2). Hence, the results of Study 3 analyzed and reported in this chapter 
represent the data trimmed after a response time of 1,400 ms. 
In contrast to the strong results of the RT data, error scores significantly 
discriminated truth tellers from liars only in Study 4 (Figure 3). In studies on the 
classic CIT, error rates tend to be less valid than RT scores and are typically not 
consulted as the central differentiating criterion (Seymour & Fraynt, 2009; 
Verschuere et al., 2010).  
Taken together, the four studies build a methodologically homogenous 
sample appropriate to conduct a meta-analysis. Especially with regard to the 
promising results of the RT data, it seemed informative to estimate the 
Credibility-CIT’s efficiency to discriminate truth tellers from liars. Hence, a first 
aim of this meta-analysis was to estimate the overall effect size of this research 
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project. A second goal was to estimate the population effect of the Credibility-
CIT’s efficiency to discriminate truth tellers from liars. 
 
 
Figure 2. RT scores for truth tellers and liars. RT score = RT on credibility 
probes - RT on irrelevant items. For the sample sizes, note that Study 4 was a 
within-subjects design. 
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Figure 3. Error scores for truth tellers and liars. Error score = error rates on 
credibility probes - error rates on irrelevant items. For the sample sizes, note that 
Study 4 was a within-subjects design. 
Method 
Inclusion Criteria 
This meta-analysis focuses on RTs and error scores as indicators of 
credibility in a CIT. Since this research project is the first implementation of a 
Credibility-CIT, only the studies reported above could be included in this meta-
analysis (k = 4 studies; n = 311 participants). As this selection makes this sample 
a comprehensive one, it resolves the need to deal with issues of publication bias 
(for a recent debate, see Carter, Schönbrodt, Gervais, & Hilgard, 2017). Given 
the implication of the importance of the response deadline as a moderator of 
effect, it could be clarifying to examine this variable in a meta-analysis. 
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However, a sample of k = 4 studies does not allow for that due to a lack of 
variance. 
Effect Size Measures 
Cohen’s d was used as the measure of effect size for the included studies. 
For the meta-analytical overall effect size, Cohen’s d tends to overestimate the 
population effect. Hence, the corrected effect size Hedges’ g is reported (adapted 
Hedges’ g = d × (1 - (3 / (4 × (N1 + N2) - 9))); Hedges, 1981). Calculations were 
conducted along the IBM SPSS syntax file for meta-analyses provided by 
Alferes (2003). 
Meta-Analytical Procedure 
Regarding the meta-analytical method, two main procedures must be 
distinguished: fixed-effects models and random-effects models. Fixed-effects 
models assume that there is a fixed underlying effect size in the population. 
Hence, the studies included in a meta-analysis should represent homogeneous 
samples of this effect. Consequently, fixed-effect models need to estimate this 
hypothesized consistency across the included studies. This is usually tested using 
Cochran’s Q-test (significant test indicating heterogeneity) or I2 (I2 = 100 × (Q - 
df) / Q; ranging from 0 = homogenous to 100 = heterogeneous; negative values 
are set equal to zero; Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). Field and 
Gillett (2010) argue that human behavior is usually not determined by single 
causes with fixed effects. Thus, fixed-effects models should not be used to 
estimate population effects in social sciences. However, fixed-effects models 
serve well whenever inferences are restricted to the effect size underlying the 
sampled studies (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). In the present meta-analysis, a fixed-
effects model is used for conclusions that are restricted to the reported research 
project. 
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In contrast, random-effects models assume that effect sizes vary in the 
population and, hence, between different studies (i.e., are heterogeneous). They 
allow for unconditional generalizations beyond the studies included in the meta-
analysis (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). A random-effects model was calculated to 
estimate the overall effect size or population effect of the Credibility-CIT. 
Power Analyses 
Comparing the four studies meta-analytically yields information about the 
Credibility-CIT’s overall effect size. This, in turn, offers the opportunity to 
determine each study’s statistical power to detect this effect with the given 
sample sizes. In terms of replicability, the statistical power indicates whether it 
is reasonable to expect all four studies to provide significant results at all. An 
underpowered test might be an explanation for the insignificant results found in 
Study 3. Power analyses were conducted with the software G*Power 3 provided 
by Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007). 
Results 
RT Score Effect 
Estimating the RT effect within this research project, the fixed-effects 
model yielded a moderate overall effect size of g = 0.40 (95% CI [0.19, 0.61]) 
for discriminating truth tellers from liars using the Credibility-CIT’s RT score. 
Figure 4 displays the corresponding forest plot. As expected, Cochran’s test of 
heterogeneity was not significant (Q = 1.01, p = .80) and I2 was negative 
(I2 = -197,03), indicating that the included studies are nearly perfectly homo-
genous.  
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Figure 4. Forest plot of the fixed-effect model’s effect sizes for discriminating 
truth tellers from liars using the RT score. Square size indicates the weighting of 
each effect size. Line length corresponds to the 95% confidence interval. 
To estimate the population effect, a random-effects model was calculated. 
This indicated an effect size of g = 0.34. The 95% confidence interval yielded an 
effect that ranged from a small to medium effect size [0.25, 0.44]. 
Error Score Effect 
The fixed-effects model indicated that the overall effect size of this research 
project was small for error scores (g = 0.26) and the 95% confidence interval did 
not include a null effect (95% CI [0.05, 0.47]). Moreover, the four studies built 
a homogenous subset (Q = 0.92, p = .82; I2 = -226,09). The random-effects model 
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yielded a small effect size for the estimated population effect (g = 0.20; 95% CI 
[0.12, 0.30]). 
Power Analyses for RT Scores 
Each study’s power to detect the Credibility-CIT’s overall effect size found 
in the meta-analysis (g = 0.40) was calculated. As evident in Figure 5, detecting 
an effect of d = 0.40 with a typically demanded power of .80 requires a sample 
size of N = 200 participants in a between-group design (i.e., n = 100 liars and n 
= 100 truth tellers). As for the studies conducted in this research project, Study 
1 had a power of 31% to detect the overall effect of d = 0.40 (including N = 55 
participants). The probability of detecting the effect in Study 2 (N = 96) and 
Study 3 (N = 114) were around chance level (1 - b = 49% and 56%, respectively). 
In contrast, the within-subjects design used in Study 4 had a power of 76% 
(N = 46, within-participants design).  
 
 
Figure 5. Power analysis for an independent-samples t-test using an effect size 
of d = 0.40. a = .05. Graph calculated with and adopted from G*Power (Faul et 
al., 2007).  
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Discussion 
According to Hedges and Vevea (1998), fixed-effects models only allow 
for generalizing within the studies included in the meta-analysis. Hence, it can 
be concluded that the four studies presented within this research project yielded 
a moderate overall effect in discriminating truth tellers from liars using a RT-
based Credibility-CIT (g = .40). Moreover, the tests of heterogeneity indicated 
that there are no genuine differences underlying the effects found in these four 
studies. Random-effects models allow for unconditional inferences beyond the 
studies included (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hedges & Vevea, 1998). The Credibility-
CIT’s estimated population effect was small (g = 0.34). Regarding error scores, 
both fixed- and random-effects models yielded small effect sizes (g = 0.26 and 
g = 0.20, respectively), but the confidence intervals indicated that the effect does 
not equal zero. Based on the Credibility-CIT’s estimated overall effect, the 
power analyses implied that Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 were underpowered. 
This gives a further reason to assume why one out of the four studies conducted 
was insignificant. Overall, the meta-analysis indicated that the Credibility-CIT 
has a meaningful potential to discriminate truth-tellers from liars using an RT-
based indirect measure.
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General Discussion 
 
This study aimed to develop the first RT-based paradigm for credibility 
assessment. In four studies, participants experienced certain unpleasant actions 
(truth tellers) or invented a story about these events (liars). During the response 
time paradigm, called the Credibility-CIT, participants were confronted with 
personalized items that were phrases from their own statements about the alleged 
events (credibility probe items). Credibility probes were mixed amongst several 
irrelevant items and target items (the latter of which were memorized by 
participants before the test) that served to draw participants’ attention. RTs and 
error rates to these three item categories were recorded. The Credibility-CIT 
proved to significantly discriminate truth tellers from liars using RTs. 
Summary of the Main Findings 
RT score discriminated truth tellers from liars. To calculate the RT score, 
the mean RT to irrelevant items was subtracted from the mean RT to probe items. 
In three studies, liars had a higher RT score than truth tellers (i.e., liars reacted 
more slowly than truth tellers to their customized credibility probes than to 
irrelevant items) with satisfactory effect sizes (dStudy 1 = 0.55, dStudy 2 = 0.42, 
dStudy 4 = 0.47). In Study 3, the effect was smaller (dStudy 3 = 0.25) and did not reach 
significance but yet descriptively resembled the three other studies. Moreover, 
the power analysis indicated that it is not unlikely to find one insignificant result 
out of four studies given their small power to find the Credibility-CIT effect at 
all (31% £ 1 - b £ 76%). Subsuming the four studies, the meta-analysis indicated 
that the RT score of the Credibility-CIT developed in this research project 
discriminates truth tellers from liars with an overall effect size of g = 0.40. 
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The Credibility-CIT’s effect size was therefore smaller than the large 
effects found in the classic RT-based CIT (d = 1.97; Verschuere et al., 2010). 
The main reason is that the classic CIT compares an experimental group 
(knowing participants) with an uninformed control group, whereas the 
Credibility-CIT compares two knowing groups (liars versus truth tellers). In the 
Credibility-CIT, the comparison between an experimental group and an 
uninformed control group indicated large effects, too (e.g., d = 1.14 between liars 
and the control group in Study 4). However, this is not the distinction of interest 
in credibility assessment. 
The comparisons with the control group (Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4) 
indicated that uninformed participants showed an unsystematic RT pattern in the 
Credibility-CIT. Hence, the probe items selected from the participants’ 
testimonies did not have any characteristics that set them apart from irrelevant 
items (i.e., in wording or syntax). The only variability is the semantic content – 
a feature that only knowing participants can identify as task-relevant. This is a 
fundamental methodological prerequisite for the Credibility-CIT’s specificity, 
i.e., the correct classification of uninformed innocents. 
Error scores were less valid. Participants had to deny any knowledge about 
their personalized credibility probe items. Confirming knowledge by erroneously 
pressing the “I know it” button and responses reaching the response deadline 
were counted as errors. Error scores were comparable in all four studies (see 
Table 2, Table 3, Table 5, and Table 8) ranging between 2-5% for truth tellers 
and 5-8% for liars. In Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3, error scores did not differ 
between the experimental groups, which is also a frequent finding in studies on 
the classic CIT (Seymour & Fraynt, 2009; Verschuere et al., 2010). In Study 4, 
however, error scores discriminated truth tellers from liars (dStudy 4 = 0.41). The 
meta-analytical results indicated an overall effect size of g = 0.20 for error scores 
in the Credibility-CIT.  
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EEG data did not discriminate truth tellers from liars. Study 4 included 
assessment of participants’ neuronal activity using an EEG-based Credibility-
CIT. However, P300 amplitudes did not differ between truth tellers and liars. 
Probe items did not induce a meaningful P300 component at all, but rather 
showed the same amplitude as irrelevant items. Based on the absence of this 
basic CIT effect, a P300 difference between liars and truth tellers could not be 
expected in this study. Overall, conclusions about the EEG-based Credibility-
CIT cannot be drawn from the present study. 
Cognitive functions and personality traits did not moderate the 
Credibility-CIT effect. Regarding the influence of cognitive functions, several 
previous studies have emphasized the role of executive control (i.e., working 
memory, inhibitory control, and task switching) for successful deception (Christ 
et al., 2009; Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Debey, De Schryver, 
Logan, Suchotzki, & Verschuere, 2015; Visu-Petra et al., 2012). However, 
responses in the Credibility-CIT were not related to intelligence or working 
memory (Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4). The only factor associated with an 
orienting towards lie-related items was accurate responding in the d2 test (Study 
4). Additionally, the Credibility-CIT effect was unrelated to most personality 
traits (Study 4). An exception is the weaker detection efficiency of the 
Credibility-CIT for more psychopathic participants. However, regarding the low 
internal consistency of the psychopathy scale, a further examination of this 
association is necessary. 
Knowledge probes indicated a successful manipulation check. For 
manipulation checking and in order to replicate findings of the classic RT-CIT, 
knowledge probes were added as a second probe category in Study 1 and Study 
2. Truth tellers reacted more slowly to knowledge probes (as compared to 
irrelevant items) than did the uninformed groups (liars and the control group). 
This is consistent with both the hypothesis and the orienting response theory as 
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well as with previous CIT studies (Hu et al., 2013; Noordraven & Verschuere, 
2013; Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Seymour et al., 2000; Suchotzki, Verschuere, et 
al., 2015; Verschuere et al., 2010, 2015; G. Visu-Petra et al., 2012). However, 
for the purpose of credibility assessment, knowledge probes were not essential 
and therefore this item category was omitted in Study 3 and Study 4.  
Theoretical Framework for the Credibility-CIT 
Based on the results cited above, it is to conclude that liars show stronger 
orienting responses and are less able to inhibit deceitful responses to credibility 
probes than truth tellers do. The central question is: Why do lie-related probes 
have a higher signal value than truth-related stimuli? Explanations for these 
findings can be drawn from CIT studies on informed innocent participants and 
on intended mock crimes (e.g., Ben-Shakhar et al., 1999; Bradley et al., 1996; 
Elaad, 2009; Gamer, 2010; Gamer et al., 2010; Meijer et al., 2010; Meixner & 
Rosenfeld, 2014; Suchotzki et al., 2013; Winograd & Rosenfeld, 2014).  
Gamer (2010) names two main arguments for explaining the different CIT 
effects in participants who committed a mock crime (guilty participants) as 
compared to innocent subjects that are solely informed about events (informed 
innocent participants) or persons who intend to commit a mock crime. Gamer 
states that differences in encoding of crime-related information and differences 
in participants’ motivation to avoid detection build the core differentiation 
criteria between the experimental groups. It is reasonable that encoding and 
emotional-motivational factors also account for the distinction between truth 
tellers and liars in the Credibility-CIT (Table 12).  
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Table 12 
Differences in Encoding and Motivation for different CIT Participant Groups. 
 
 Encoding  
Motivation 
to avoid 
detection 
Classic CIT     
Innocent 
participants  
No encoding of task-relevant 
information at all  
None 
Guilty 
participants  
Handling task-related objects, 
incidental and shallow encoding   
High  
Informed 
innocents  
Gaining information incidentally, 
semantic processing, shallow 
encoding  
 
Moderate  
Participants 
intending to 
commit a mock 
crime 
 
Dealing intentionally and mentally 
with the task, using semantic 
memory, elaborate encoding 
 
Moderate 
Credibility-CIT     
Truth tellers  Handling task-related objects, incidental and shallow encoding  
Low 
Liars 
 
Dealing intentionally and mentally 
with the task, using semantic 
memory, elaborate encoding 
 
High 
 
Elaboration of Encoding during the Interview 
According to the cognitive load theory (Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij & 
Mann, 2006), inventing the story and mastering the interview are both highly 
demanding for liars. Liars must intentionally memorize information on the 
alleged event and associate the memory content to cognitive scripts about similar 
occurrences. This utilization of semantic memory content represents an elaborate 
rehearsal process, which is associated with elaborate encoding (Craik & 
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Lockhart, 1972). Besides the effort to invent a story, the cognitive load theory 
states that finally telling the lie during the interview is also more demanding for 
liars than telling the truth is for truth tellers. During the interrogation, an episodic 
memory trace is formed which comprises the content of the story and the effort 
of giving the statement. Hence, the interview serves to consolidate the relevant 
information again. The fabrication, including the careful selection of central 
details, and the episodic memory of the challenging interview should lead to an 
elaborately encoded memory for the person telling the lie. When confronted with 
the corresponding items in the CIT, the phrases have a high familiarity. This, in 
turn, induces a high signal value and elicits a strong orienting response. 
Inhibiting responses to these items is challenging. 
According to the enactment effect (Cohen, 1989) one might expect 
participants who actually performed the tasks – those in the truth telling 
condition in these studies – to encode these events elaborately and remember 
them well. However, in Study 1 truth tellers did not react differentially to 
credibility probes at all. One reason for this might be a lack of memory about the 
events, which results in poorer retrieval (Bradley et al., 2011). However, it seems 
unlikely that most participants in the truth-telling group forgot about 
experiencing these unconventional tasks. Moreover, participants’ systematic 
reactions to the knowledge probes in Study 1 and Study 2 showed that truth 
tellers remembered the scenario sufficiently. Hence, a lack of memory for truth 
tellers is an unlikely reason for the differences between the experimental groups. 
An explanation of this difference might lie in the relevance of the interview. For 
truth tellers, the interview was neither cognitively demanding (as they just retold 
previous experiences) nor emotionally challenging because concerns about 
incredibility were certainly low in this laboratory setting. Hence, the 
interrogation might play a minor role in consolidation compared to the enactment 
during which they encoded the stimuli only incidentally. Accordingly, the 
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credibility probes have only a moderate signal value for truth tellers. After all, 
encoding is less elaborate and consequently credibility probes have a lower 
significance for truth tellers than for liars.  
Another relevant feature related to encoding is the time between encoding 
and CIT. The interaction of depth of encoding and the interval between encoding 
and RT-CIT was emphasized in a study by Seymour and Fraynt (2009). They 
determined that after a one-week interval the RT difference between elaborately 
and shallowly encoded information was larger than in immediate assessment (see 
Figure 1, p. 25). In the present Credibility-CIT studies, a one-week interval 
between the encoding of information (fabricating/experiencing and giving the 
interview) and the Credibility-CIT was used. Provided that encoding differences 
drive the varying Credibility-CIT effects between truth tellers and liars, this one-
week interval might have enhanced the paradigm’s detection accuracy.  
Emotional-Motivational Factors 
Our “default mode” is to tell the truth; lying is a deviation from this mode 
and associated with emotional arousal (Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1989; Verschuere 
& Ben-Shakhar, 2011). The effect of emotional-motivational factors can be 
integrated into the theoretical framework. It is conceivable that liars had a higher 
motivation to avoid detection than truth tellers had. The liars may have feared 
being detected twice – in the interview and in the Credibility-CIT. Effort to avoid 
detection might additionally enhance the noteworthiness of the credibility probe 
items for liars and, hence, lead to a stronger orienting response. This pattern 
corresponds to the relevance of emotional arousal for memory processes: Events 
with emotional relevance lead to higher stress hormone levels and, hence, to 
stronger memory traces (Cahill, Prins, Weber, & McGaugh, 1994). Both strong 
orienting and elaborate encoding should make it difficult for participants to 
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quickly classify probes taken from one’s previous lies as “unfamiliar” in the 
Credibility-CIT. 
Retrieval of Information during the Credibility-CIT 
In addition to the encoding and emotional-motivational explanations put 
forth by Gamer (2010), the ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014) has an explanatory 
value for understanding patterns of response to the Credibility-CIT. According 
to ADCAT and other authors (Debey et al., 2014; Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014), 
every question by default activates the true answer in long-term memory – 
irrespective of the individual’s intention to answer honestly or deceptively. The 
activated true response automatically enters working memory. In the Credibility-
CIT, the to-be answered question is “Do you know this term?”. Following this 
line of reasoning, when confronted with a credibility probe item, for both truth 
tellers and liars the automatic, true response is to affirm the question, whereas 
the task requires denying this knowledge. However, the following cognitive 
processes differ crucially between truth tellers and liars. For liars, the activated 
truth involves memories about the process of inventing the story and lying in the 
face of the interviewer during the testimony – the elaborately encoded 
information. This large amount of information is kept active and has to be 
processed during all consecutive ADCAT steps; it serves as a retrieval cue in the 
construction component and has to be inhibited in the action component. 
Moreover, the evaluation of costs and benefits of lying (decision component) is 
also more time-consuming for liars as they have a higher motivation to avoid 
being debunked. These additional cognitive processes add more to RTs for liars 
than they do for truth tellers. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The present project focused on foundational research for the development 
of the Credibility-CIT. The central aim was the development of the basic 
paradigm and the replication of the first results. Consequently, there are 
numerous topics further research should address. First and foremost, the 
theoretical framework must be specified. The effects of depth of encoding, 
memory processes, and emotional-motivational factors on the Credibility-CIT 
are first explanatory approaches. Future studies should systematically 
manipulate and elucidate these effects.  
There is also a need for methodological optimization. Given that this 
research project was the first attempt to develop an RT-based paradigm for 
credibility assessment, the effect sizes were satisfying. However, reliabilities 
were low and an overall effect of g = 0.40 is not large enough to use the 
Credibility-CIT in its present form for single-case diagnostics. Luckily, there are 
ample opportunities for methodological optimization. For example, results from 
Study 3 indicated that a systematic evaluation of the impact of response deadlines 
is a promising avenue to pursue to increase detection efficiency. Not only the 
Credibility-CIT but also the classic CIT would benefit from further research on 
the impact of response deadlines.  
Varying the number of probe items or manipulating the probe-irrelevant 
proportion might also have potential to improve the Credibility-CIT’s detection 
efficiency. Consistent with the classical test theory, increasing the number of 
probe items descriptively enhances the Credibility-CIT’s reliability (rtt = .27 
using 10 probe items in Study 1 versus .28 £ rtt £ .55 using 15 probes in Studies 
2, 3 and 4). However, results on the Credibility-CIT and the classic CIT imply 
that lengthening the test might be a threat to its validity since habituation and the 
practicing of countermeasures can occur (Suchotzki, Verschuere, et al., 2015). A 
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systematic evaluation is necessary. Ideally, further strategies than test 
lengthening should be evaluated to improve the CIT’s reliability and 
consequently its validity. Most central for that purpose is the extraction of 
meaningful phrases from each participant’s testimony that serve as items for the 
Credibility-CIT. 
Testing the Credibility-CIT with further peripheral or central physiological 
measures could prove informative given that the classic CIT is associated with 
significant physiological indicators. Combining behavioral (RT) data and 
physiological indicators would enhance the Credibility-CIT’s validity by 
offering a multi-method approach. In studies on the classic CIT, ERPs 
(especially P300 amplitudes) and skin conductance yield large effect sizes 
(Meijer et al., 2014). As discussed above, it remains unclear why the ERP-based 
Credibility-CIT did not yield meaningful P300 amplitudes for credibility probe 
items in Study 4. 
Regarding studies on further fields of application, a potentially informative 
research question is whether the Credibility-CIT would yield meaningful results 
in contexts of suggestion. Suggestions can induce pseudo memories – a 
circumstance in which persons subjectively believe a fictitious event took place. 
Interestingly, participants with pseudo memories resemble truth tellers in terms 
of their motivational and affective states; both groups think they experienced the 
event and believe their own story. In contrast, the encoding of the event-related 
information is similar to that of liars as both, liars and people with pseudo-
memories, cannot rely on episodic memory. Since recent diagnostic methods 
such as the SVA cannot reliably discriminate true and suggested statements 
(Volbert & Steller, 2014), applying the Credibility-CIT for this purpose would 
represent a major advance for credibility assessment. Admittedly, predicting the 
direction and size of this effect is challenging with regard to the very basic 
knowledge the present four studies supply regarding the Credibility-CIT. 
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However, after refining the theoretical framework and implementing the above-
named methodological optimizations, the research potential seems promising.  
After optimizing and replicating the results on the Credibility-CIT in further 
laboratory studies, field studies would give important insight in the practicability 
of the paradigm. It is conceivable that the elaboration of encoding as well as the 
emotional and motivational state differ substantially in laboratory versus real-
life circumstances. In real-life scenarios, truth tellers should be more emotionally 
involved and liars should engage in inventing an even more coherent story. Both 
factors should enhance the signal value of the credibility probe items. It remains 
unclear whether a more realistic setting would strengthen or reduce the effects 
found in laboratory work such as that presented in this research report. 
Regarding the practical applicability of the Credibility-CIT, the finding that 
the Credibility-CIT works in the same way for victims and offenders (Study 1 
and Study 2) offers an additional area of application, namely the detection of 
false confessions. Suspects giving false confessions can be considered parallel to 
those participants who were “offenders” during the initial experience and then 
lied during their testimony. Suspects who constructed a complex lie about having 
committed a crime would be expected to undergo similar cognitive and 
motivational processes as persons who pretend to be the victim of an offense. 
Hence, the theoretical explanations consulted for the Credibility-CIT also 
account for a False-Confessions-CIT. 
Conclusions 
The Credibility-CIT is a promising paradigm to complement classic 
approaches for credibility assessment, like the SVA. From a practitioner’s 
perspective, the Credibility-CIT is economical and easy to apply subsequent to 
the SVA interview without influencing the SVA’s validity at all. The medium 
effect size found in Study 1 (d = 0.55) indicates the potential of this paradigm. 
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Even though the current detection efficiency is not sufficient for single-case 
assessment, with further optimization it might reach or even outperform common 
witness-related evidence in court, like the CBCA (g = 0.97, Oberlader et al., 
2016) or the rather unreliable eyewitnesses (correct classification rate of 50%; 
Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Therefore, the Credibility-CIT can 
contribute to the incremental validity of current credibility assessment 
procedures.  
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Appendix A 
Teilnehmerinformation für lügende Teilnehmer, Rolle „Opfer / Akteur“  
 
 
 
Liebe(r) Interessent(in),  
 
vielen Dank für dein Interesse an unserer Studie!  
In der Studie geht es um Zeugenaussagen. Manchmal kommt es vor, dass Zeugen 
bei der Polizei oder vor einem Richter lügen. Wir wollen deshalb erforschen, wie 
gut Personen Aussagen erfinden können. Wir untersuchen, ob Personen, die sich 
ein Erlebnis ausdenken eine genau so gute Zeugenaussage machen können, wie 
Personen, die das Erlebnis wirklich hatten. Wenn du mit der Teilnahme 
einverstanden bist, werden wir dich deshalb bitten, eine gewisse Geschichte zu 
erfinden. Danach sollst du zu diesem angeblichen Erlebnis eine möglichst 
überzeugende „Zeugenaussage“ machen. Du hast 30 Minuten Zeit, dir die 
Geschichte auszudenken. Das Erlebnis, das du erfinden sollst, hat folgende 
Rahmenhandlung: 
 
Stell dir vor, du würdest mit einer anderen Person hier in die Schule kommen, 
um an der Studie teilzunehmen. Der andere würde die Aufgabe bekommen, dich 
dazu bringen, mehrere sehr unangenehme oder eklige Aktionen durchzuführen. 
Er dürfte aus der folgenden Liste fünf Dinge auswählen, die du danach machen 
solltest: 
- Einen Keks essen, auf dem ein getrockneter Wurm liegt 
- Verschiedene Dinge in einer Box ertasten, in die man nicht hineinschauen 
kann 
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- Möglichst lange den Arm nach vorne ausstrecken und dabei einen 
Gegenstand festhalten 
- Schmutziges Klopapier anfassen 
- Ein benutztes, stinkendes T-Shirt überziehen 
- Füße in Schleim tauchen 
- Hände in Dreck halten 
- Mit klebrigen Händen Sachen aus einer Kiste holen 
 
Der andere Teilnehmer würde fünf der Aktionen auswählen und die Utensilien 
dafür würden in einen Raum hier in der Schule gebracht. Er würde versuchen 
dich dazu zu bringen, möglichst alle der fünf ausgesuchten Aufgaben zu 
erledigen. Dir gefällt das aber gar nicht gut, denn die Aktionen sind wirklich 
unangenehm. Vielleicht würdest du dich sogar gegen manche Aufgaben wehren. 
 
Bitte versuche, dich gut in diese Situation hineinzuversetzen, denn du wirst in 
einer halben Stunde zu diesem Erlebnis gefragt. Die Interviewerin weiß nicht, ob 
du wirklich etwas erlebt hast und sie darf auf keinen Fall merken, dass du dir 
alles nur ausgedacht hast. Bitte denke dir daher möglichst detailliert aus, was du 
angeblich erlebt hast. Du kannst auch viel dazu erfinden, aber es müssen fünf der 
aufgelisteten Aktionen in deiner Aussage vorkommen. Erzähle ihr, was dir 
angeblich passiert ist und was der andere mit dir gemacht hat. 
Bitte versuche, möglichst überzeugend deine angeblichen Erlebnisse zu 
schildern. Du hast nachher für deine Aussage so lange Zeit, wie du brauchst.  
Zum Abschluss weisen wir dich noch darauf hin, dass für etwaige Unfälle 
während der Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. 
Versicherung besteht. 
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Wenn du nicht mehr an der Studie teilnehmen möchtest, kannst du das jederzeit 
sagen und solltest du Fragen haben, so kannst du sie gerne stellen.  
 
Mit einer Teilnahme würdest du uns sehr helfen und einen wichtigen Beitrag zur 
psychologischen Forschung leisten. Wenn du bereit bist, teilzunehmen, fülle 
bitte auf der folgenden Seite die schriftliche Einverständniserklärung aus und 
unterschreibe sie. 
 
Wir danken dir ganz herzlich für dein Interesse an unserer Studie! 
 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Banse, Kathrin Eickmeier und Jelena Rönspies 
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Appendix B 
Teilnehmerinformation für lügende Teilnehmer, Rolle „Täter / 
Versuchsleiter“ 
 
 
 
 
Liebe(r) Interessent(in),  
 
vielen Dank für dein Interesse an unserer Studie!  
In der Studie geht es um Zeugenaussagen. Manchmal kommt es vor, dass Zeugen 
bei der Polizei oder vor einem Richter lügen. Wir wollen deshalb erforschen, wie 
gut Personen Aussagen erfinden können. Wir untersuchen, ob Personen, die sich 
ein Erlebnis ausdenken eine genau so gute Zeugenaussage machen können, wie 
Personen, die das Erlebnis wirklich hatten. Wenn du mit der Teilnahme 
einverstanden bist, werden wir dich deshalb bitten, eine gewisse Geschichte zu 
erfinden. Danach sollst du zu diesem angeblichen Erlebnis eine möglichst 
überzeugende „Zeugenaussage“ machen. Du hast 30 Minuten Zeit, dir die 
Geschichte auszudenken. Das Erlebnis, das du erfinden sollst, hat folgende 
Rahmenhandlung: 
 
Stell dir vor, du würdest mit einer anderen Person in die Schule kommen, um an 
der Studie teilzunehmen. Du würdest die Rolle eines Versuchsleiters bekommen 
und solltest den anderen Teilnehmer dazu bringen, einige sehr unangenehme 
oder eklige Aktionen durchzuführen. Du dürftest aus der folgenden Liste fünf 
Dinge auswählen, die der andere danach machen soll: 
  
The Credibility-CIT 
 114 
- Einen Keks essen, auf dem ein getrockneter Wurm liegt 
- Verschiedene Dinge in einer Box ertasten, in die man nicht hineinschauen 
kann 
- Möglichst lange den Arm nach vorne ausstrecken und dabei einen 
Gegenstand festhalten 
- Schmutziges Klopapier anfassen 
- Ein benutztes, stinkendes T-Shirt überziehen 
- Füße in Schleim tauchen 
- Hände in Dreck halten 
- Mit klebrigen Händen Sachen aus einer Kiste holen 
 
Du würdest fünf der Aktionen auswählen und die Utensilien dafür würden in 
einen Raum hier in der Schule gebracht. Du würdest versuchen die andere 
Person dazu zu bringen, möglichst alle der fünf ausgesuchten Aufgaben zu 
erledigen. Dem anderen würde das aber gar nicht gut gefallen, denn die 
Aktionen sind wirklich unangenehm. Vielleicht würde er sich sogar gegen die 
Durchführung wehren. 
 
Bitte versuche, dich gut in diese Situation hineinzuversetzen, denn du wirst in 
einer halben Stunde zu diesem Erlebnis gefragt. Die Interviewerin weiß nicht, ob 
du wirklich etwas erlebt hast und sie darf auf keinen Fall merken, dass du dir 
alles nur ausgedacht hast. Bitte denke dir daher möglichst detailliert aus, was du 
angeblich erlebt hast. Du kannst auch viel dazu erfinden, aber es müssen fünf der 
aufgelisteten Aktionen in deiner Aussage vorkommen. Erzähle ihr, was dir 
angeblich passiert ist und was du mit dem anderen gemacht hast. 
Bitte versuche, möglichst überzeugend deine angeblichen Erlebnisse zu 
schildern. Du hast nachher für deine Aussage so lange Zeit, wie du brauchst.  
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Zum Abschluss weisen wir dich noch darauf hin, dass für etwaige Unfälle 
während der Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. 
Versicherung besteht. 
Wenn du nicht mehr an der Studie teilnehmen möchtest, kannst du das jederzeit 
sagen und solltest du Fragen haben, so kannst du sie gerne stellen.  
 
Mit einer Teilnahme würdest du uns sehr helfen und einen wichtigen Beitrag zur 
psychologischen Forschung leisten. Wenn du bereit bist, teilzunehmen, fülle 
bitte auf der folgenden Seite die schriftliche Einverständniserklärung aus und 
unterschreibe sie. 
 
Wir danken dir ganz herzlich für dein Interesse an unserer Studie! 
 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Banse, Kathrin Eickmeier und Jelena Rönspies 
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Appendix C 
Teilnehmerinformation für wahraussagende Teilnehmer, Rolle „Opfer / 
Akteur“  
 
 
 
 
Liebe(r) Interessent(in),  
 
vielen Dank für dein Interesse an unserer Studie! Du hilfst uns damit sehr und 
leistest damit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur psychologischen Forschung. 
In der Studie geht es um Zeugenaussagen. Manchmal kommt es vor, dass Zeugen 
bei der Polizei oder vor einem Richter lügen. Wir wollen deshalb erforschen, wie 
gut Personen Aussagen erfinden können. Wir untersuchen, ob Personen, die sich 
ein Erlebnis ausdenken eine genau so gute Zeugenaussage machen können, wie 
Personen, die das Erlebnis wirklich hatten. Wenn du mit der Teilnahme 
einverstanden bist, wirst du daher heute eine Situation erleben und danach zum 
Geschehenen eine „Zeugenaussage“ machen.  
 
Das erwartet dich heute: 
Ein anderer Teilnehmer wird dich dazu bringen wollen, einige unangenehme 
oder eklige Aktionen durchzuführen. Manche Aktionen empfindest du aber 
vielleicht als spannend oder als Herausforderung.  
Der andere sucht aus der folgenden Liste fünf Aktionen aus, die du gleich 
machen sollst: 
- Einen Keks essen, auf dem ein getrockneter Wurm lag 
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- Verschiedene Dinge in einer Box ertasten, in die man nicht hineinschauen 
kann 
- Möglichst lange den Arm nach vorne ausstrecken und dabei einen 
Gegenstand festhalten 
- Schmutziges Klopapier anfassen 
- Ein benutztes, stinkendes T-Shirt überziehen 
- Füße in Schleim tauchen 
- Hände in Dreck halten 
- Mit klebrigen Händen Sachen aus einer Kiste holen 
 
Niemand zwingt dich zu der Teilnahme und es ist immer möglich, einfach 
aufzuhören. Du musst nichts tun, was du nicht möchtest und du kannst mit dem 
anderen darüber diskutieren. Wir als Studienleiter befinden uns im Nebenraum 
und sehen euch auf einem Monitor. 
 
 Zum Abschluss weisen wir dich noch darauf hin, dass für etwaige Unfälle 
während der Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. 
Versicherung besteht. 
Wenn du nicht mehr an der Studie teilnehmen möchtest, kannst du das jederzeit 
sagen und solltest du Fragen haben, so kannst du sie gerne stellen.  
 
Mit einer Teilnahme würdest du uns sehr helfen und einen wichtigen Beitrag zur 
psychologischen Forschung leisten. Wenn du bereit bist, teilzunehmen, fülle 
bitte auf der folgenden Seite die schriftliche Einverständniserklärung aus und 
unterschreibe sie. 
Wir danken dir ganz herzlich für dein Interesse an unserer Studie! 
 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Banse, Kathrin Eickmeier und Jelena Rönspies 
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Appendix D 
Teilnehmerinformation für wahraussagende Teilnehmer, Rolle „Täter / 
Versuchsleiter“  
 
 
 
 
Liebe(r) Interessent(in),  
 
vielen Dank für dein Interesse an unserer Studie!  
In der Studie geht es um Zeugenaussagen. Manchmal kommt es vor, dass Zeugen 
bei der Polizei oder vor einem Richter lügen. Wir wollen deshalb erforschen, wie 
gut Personen Aussagen erfinden können. Wir untersuchen, ob Personen, die sich 
ein Erlebnis ausdenken eine genau so gute Zeugenaussage machen können, wie 
Personen, die das Erlebnis wirklich hatten. Wenn du mit der Teilnahme 
einverstanden bist, wirst du daher heute eine Situation erleben und danach zum 
Geschehenen eine „Zeugenaussage“ machen. 
 
Das erwartet dich heute: 
Deine Aufgabe wird ist es, einen anderen Teilnehmer dazu zu bringen, einige 
unangenehme oder eklige Aktionen durchzuführen. Bitte suche aus der 
folgenden Liste fünf Aktionen aus, die die andere Person machen soll: 
- Einen Keks essen, auf dem ein getrockneter Wurm lag 
- Verschiedene Dinge in einer Box ertasten, in die man nicht hineinschauen 
kann 
- Möglichst lange den Arm nach vorne ausstrecken und dabei einen 
Gegenstand festhalten 
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- Schmutziges Klopapier anfassen 
- Ein benutztes, stinkendes T-Shirt überziehen 
- Füße in Schleim tauchen 
- Hände in Dreck halten 
- Mit klebrigen Händen Sachen aus einer Kiste holen 
 
Der andere wird diese Dinge sicherlich nicht ganz freiwillig machen, aber du 
sollst es schaffen, dass er möglichst viele der Dinge erledigt. Versuche möglichst 
gut, den anderen zu überzeugen. Wir als Versuchsleiter befinden uns im 
Nebenraum und sehen euch auf einem Monitor.  
Zum Abschluss weisen wir dich noch darauf hin, dass für etwaige Unfälle 
während der Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. 
Versicherung besteht. 
Wenn du nicht mehr an der Studie teilnehmen möchtest, kannst du das jederzeit 
sagen und solltest du Fragen haben, so kannst du sie gerne stellen.  
 
Mit einer Teilnahme würdest du uns sehr helfen und einen wichtigen Beitrag zur 
psychologischen Forschung leisten. Wenn du bereit bist, teilzunehmen, fülle 
bitte auf der folgenden Seite die schriftliche Einverständniserklärung aus und 
unterschreibe sie. 
 
Wir danken dir ganz herzlich für dein Interesse an unserer Studie! 
 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Banse, Jelena Rönspies und Kathrin Eickmeier 
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Appendix E 
Einverständniserklärung der Schüler  
 
 
 
 
 
Einverständniserklärung 
 
Ich _________________________________________(Name) bin mit der 
Teilnahme an der Studie einverstanden.  
 
- Ich bin darüber informiert worden, dass die Teilnahme an der Studie freiwillig 
erfolgt und von mir jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen und ohne negative 
Konsequenzen beendet werden kann. 
- Ich bin damit einverstanden, dass meine Aussage auf Tonband aufgenommen 
wird. Die Aufnahme wird von der Studienleitung nur bis zum Abschluss der 
Auswertung der Studie gespeichert und dann sofort gelöscht. Die übrigen 
Daten werden anonym gespeichert und erlauben keine Rückschlüsse auf 
meine Person. 
- Ich bin darüber aufgeklärt worden, dass für etwaige Unfälle während der 
Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. Versicherung 
besteht. 
- Mir ist bewusst, dass ich nicht mit anderen Schülern über den Verlauf der 
Studie sprechen darf. 
 
 
Datum, Unterschrift_________________________________________ 
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Appendix F  
Elterninformation und Elterneinverständnis 
 
 
Wie gut können Kinder und Jugendliche Zeugenaussagen machen? 
 
Liebe Eltern,  
im Rahmen unserer Studie am Institut für Psychologie der Universität Bonn 
erforschen wir die Eigenschaften von Zeugenaussagen von Kindern und 
Jugendlichen. Dabei interessieren uns sowohl Aussagen über tatsächlich erlebte 
Ereignisse als auch erfundene Schilderungen. 
Nicht selten muss in Strafprozessen anhand der Zeugenaussagen von Kindern 
und Jugendlichen entschieden werden, ob eine Straftat tatsächlich stattgefunden 
hat. Daher ist es sehr wichtig Kriterien zu bestimmen, die eine Unterscheidung 
von erfundenen oder erlebten Ereignissen erlauben. Ziel unserer Studie ist es, die 
psychologischen Methoden in diesem Bereich noch zuverlässiger zu machen. 
In unserer Studie werden Kinder und Jugendliche zu zweit einige Aufgaben 
entweder tatsächlich erledigen oder sich den Ablauf der Aufgaben nur 
ausdenken. Einige dieser Aufgaben sind so gestaltet, dass sie – immer auf 
spielerischer Ebene – ein bisschen eklig sind oder Mut erfordern (z.B. schleimige 
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Lebensmittel anfassen, blind Gegenstände ertasten). Unabhängig davon, ob die 
Aufgabe erlebt 
oder erfunden wurde, werden die Kinder anschließend zu der Situation befragt. 
Erfundene und erlebte Aussagen werden dann von uns anhand verschiedener 
Kriterien verglichen. Zusätzlich wird von den Kindern ein kurzes, neu 
entwickeltes Computerprogramm bearbeitet, das zwischen den beiden Gruppen 
unterscheiden soll. Dabei soll eine Reihe von Begriffen auswendig gelernt und 
diese in einer Menge anderer Wörter wiedererkannt werden. 
 
Wenn Ihr Kind Interesse an der Teilnahme hat, müsste im Rahmen des 
Psychologie-Unterrichts an der IGS Beuel an zwei Terminen teilnehmen. Der 
erste Termin dauert 45 bis 60 Minuten. In dieser Zeit wird das Geschehen, je 
nach Gruppenzugehörigkeit, erlebt bzw. erfunden und danach eine Aussage dazu 
gemacht. Das Erlebnis wird auf Video und die Aussage auf Tonband 
aufgezeichnet, damit die Aussage im Nachhinein von den Studienleitern 
ausgewertet werden kann. Beim zweiten Termin wird die Aufgabe am Computer 
erledigt, welche ca. 30 Minuten in Anspruch nimmt. Als kleines Dankeschön 
bekommen die Teilnehmer die Möglichkeit an der Verlosung mehrerer 
Gutscheine teilzunehmen. Alle erhobenen Daten werden vollständig anonym 
erhoben, so dass keine Rückschlüsse von den erhobenen Daten auf die 
Teilnehmer möglich sind. Die Tonband- und Videoaufzeichnungen werden nach 
Abschluss der Auswertungen unverzüglich und unwiderruflich gelöscht. Es wird 
sichergestellt, dass zu keinem Zeitpunkt Rückschlüsse auf die Ergebnisse 
einzelner Kinder gezogen werden können. Sämtliche Aufgaben, die die 
Teilnehmer absolvieren, werden permanent von der Studienleitung (die von 
geschulten Psychologinnen übernommen wird) überwacht. Die Kinder können 
Appendix 
 123 
zudem die Teilnahme an der Studie ohne Weiteres und zu jedem Zeitpunkt 
abbrechen. 
Zum Abschluss weisen wir Sie noch darauf hin, dass für etwaige Unfälle 
während der Untersuchung eine verschuldensabhängige Haftung bzw. 
Versicherung besteht. 
Wir würden uns freuen, wenn Ihr Kind an unserer Studie teilnehmen möchte und 
Sie ihr Einverständnis dazu geben. Durch eine Teilnahme leisten Sie und Ihr 
Kind einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Forschung im Bereich kindlicher 
Zeugenaussagen. 
Wenn Sie weitere Fragen haben sollten, können Sie sich gerne über die oben 
genannten Kontaktdaten mit uns in Verbindung setzen.  
 
Wir danken Ihnen für Ihr Interesse und verbleiben mit freundlichen Grüßen, 
 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Banse, Jelena Rönspies und Kathrin Eickmeier 
  
The Credibility-CIT 
 124 
 
(Diese Seite ist vom Teilnehmer zum ersten Studientermin mitzubringen) 
 
 
 
Einverständniserklärung Studie zu Zeugenaussagen von Kindern 
und Jugendlichen 
Name des Kindes: ____________________________________ 
Mein Kind hat bekannte Allergien oder Unverträglichkeiten         
      Ja   Nein 
Wenn ja, folgende: ___________________________________ 
 
Hiermit erlaube ich meiner Tochter/meinem Sohn an der Studie zu 
Zeugenaussagen der Universität Bonn teilzunehmen. Ich bin darüber aufgeklärt 
worden, dass die Universität Bonn für etwaige Unfälle meines Kindes während 
der Teilnahme an der Studie verschuldensabhängig haftet. 
 
Datum und Unterschrift des Erziehungsberechtigten:  
_____________________________ 
 
 
